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This paper studies whether and how investments by public pension funds result in a
dierent social impact, measured by employment growth, relative to investments by other
large investors. Using commercial real estate (CRE) investments as a laboratory, I compare
direct pension fund CRE investments to a counterfactual of real estate private equity (REPE)
CRE investments. I document that CRE investments by public pension funds are associated
with 3.5% higher zip code employment relative to REPE CRE investments. The eect is
more pronounced for investments in the pension fund's home state and for pension funds
with more political appointees on their board make investments that have a larger impact
on employment. I also provide evidence for two potential mechanisms: (1) after a pension
fund invests, $40M of additional capital from other investors ows to the invested zip code;
and (2) pension funds invest 28% more CAPEX into their properties than REPE funds.
Furthermore, investments earning bottom quartile returns exhibit large positive employment
impact, especially for home state investments, evidence that suggests a trade-o between
returns and social impact.
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Public pension funds may have investment motives beyond standard risk-return optimization.
Recent literature suggests that agency problems, stemming from the political environment
in which public pension funds operate, lead to poor nancial performance. For instance, po-
litical representation on the board of trustees is associated with choosing underperforming
private equity funds (Andonov et al. (2018)) and political pressure can result in overweighting
local investments (Hochberg and Rauh (2013)). Moreover, regulatory incentives and under-
funding amplify risk-taking behavior (Andonov et al. (2017)).1 A less studied deviation from
value maximization is having multiple objectives, stated or not, where capital is invested in
projects that could potentially boost economic growth (i.e. have socially positive benets).
Recent work studies the return implications of this additional consideration. Barber et al.
(2019) show that public pension funds earn lower returns on investments in impact" VC
funds which the authors interpret as evidence that social objectives do receive a weight in
the objective function. However, there is no direct evidence that measures the social impact
associated with investments by public pension funds. It is unclear whether public pension
fund investments actually generate socially positive benets that they value, how they do so
relative to other large investors, and whether this social impact comes at a cost of nancial
returns.
1Hochberg and Rauh (2013) show that home bias for pension fund PE investments positively correlates with
political corruption indices. Andonov et al. (2018) show that increased political representation on pension
fund boards is associated with earning lower returns on investments made by the pension fund. Dyck et al.
(2020) show that pension funds choose bad PE fund managers because of plan participant outrage at the
large fees paid to nancial advisors. Andonov et al. (2017) show that public pension funds with more
underfunding take on more risky investments to take advantage of regulatory incentives that tie expected
returns on investments to liability discount rates.
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In this paper, I utilize commercial real estate (CRE) investments as a laboratory to test
whether pension fund investments are associated with subsequent employment growth in the
zip codes where they invest. Employment is a real economic outcome that public pension
funds commonly target.2 Specically, I compare direct investments in CRE properties by
pension funds to a baseline counterfactual of investments made by real estate private eq-
uity (REPE) funds. Using REPE funds is a useful counterfactual for two reasons. First,
contracting between Limited Partners (LPs) and General Partners (GPs) results in minimal
risk-return incentive distortions. Second, pension funds are major capital contributors to
REPE funds3, so comparing the dierential impact on employment of direct investments
by pension funds and REPE funds is analogous to comparing investments with additional
impact objectives and those without.
Using a dierence-in-dierences approach, I estimate that public pension fund CRE in-
vestments are associated with a 3.5% increase in employment, in the 4 years that follow,
relative to investments by REPE funds in zip codes with similar ex-ante characteristics.
Additional tests uncover the dynamics: there is a 2% gain in the rst year, indicating that
roughly 60% of the eect occurs soon after investment.4
I also perform cross-sectional tests to understand the heterogeneity of the eect based on
the location of the investments and the amount of political inuence on the board. Home
state investments that can generate additional economic growth are particularly valuable to
pension funds since these types of investments are a key focus of their dual mandate.5 I nd
2See Appendix A for some examples.
3Based on data in Preqin, roughly 30% of all capital committed to REPE funds comes from public pension
funds (Preqin (2016))
4I focus the analysis on such a disaggregated level because the urban economics literature shows that ag-
glomeration eects manifest most strongly at the zip code level because of rms' proximity to one another
(Rosenthal and Strange (2003)). Based on this evidence, I conjecture that zip codes are the ideal level of
aggregation to test for employment eects instead of larger aggregations such as MSA or county.
5While pension funds can state their dual mandates directly in their investment policy or annual report,
pension funds often consider the potential impact of their investments even if they are not explicit about
it.
2
that home state investments result in a 6% increase in zip code employment, relative to REPE
CRE investments, and this eect is signicantly dierent from the average eect. In addition,
I nd that investments in distant states also generate modest subsequent employment growth
of 2%, relative to REPE funds, after 4 years. While pension funds may not have direct
incentives to invest for growth elsewhere, their consideration of the downstream impacts of
their investment choices could permeate their evaluation process for all projects leading them
to prefer investments that, all else equal, would be more likely to generate positive benets.
Political representation on the board will also aect the strength of the incentives to
invest for economic growth. Using a triple-dierence approach, I show that boards with
above median representation of political appointees, in percent, make investments associated
with a subsequent employment increase of 4.7%. This eect is 2.8% greater than for boards
with below median representation of political appointees. These results, together with the
ndings about home state investments, indicate that in situtions where motives for impact
are strongest larger measurable social impacts do result.
In additional analyses, I show that service sector employment in the treated zip code
increases, as opposed to goods-producing sector jobs, and that employment increases at
small businesses, classied as those with fewer than 50 employees. The magnitude of the
eect is similar for larger businesses, dened as those with more than 50 employees.
Why does employment increase more after public pension fund CRE investments relative
to REPE fund investments? I provide evidence for two possible explanations that aect the
supply-side of the real estate market. First, since public pension funds are often sophisticated
investors their investment in a zip code could act as an informative signal to other investors
about the quality of CRE assets located there. I nd that roughly $40M in additional capital
ows to the zip code in the 4 years that follow pension fund investment, with over two-thirds
of the additional capital coming from REPE funds and developers. I perform a similar test
at the county level and nd no signicant eect on subsequent capital ows from other
investors. These results imply that the additional ex-post CRE capital ows from other
3
investors are specic to the treated zip codes. Subsequent capital ow from other investors
can help to increase the productivity of existing CRE assets in the zip code or can build
new supply allowing rms to expand. For example, REPE funds can pursue value-added
investment strategies to optimize inecient properties through renovation or re-tenanting of
a property and developers construct entirely new properties. Both activities help to relax
constraints on the supply of space.
Second, I utilize property-level cash ow data to understand if pension funds manage
their properties dierently than REPE funds such that local employment is aected. For
instance, the pension funds could undertake investment or leasing programs after purchase
with the intent to increase productivity of the building and, ultimately, its market value.
Capital investments increase and improve the productive capacity of buildings which directly
impacts employment by relaxing space constraints for rms located in the zip code allowing
them to hire and grow. Leasing and tenant management activity enables the expansion of
existing rms or attracts new rms to the zip code. I compare the cumulative capital expen-
ditures (CAPEX) for properties owned by public pension funds to the cumulative CAPEX
of properties owned by REPE funds to test whether pension funds conduct more inten-
sive asset management. I nd that pension funds spend, on average, 28% more cumulative
CAPEX than REPE funds in the rst 4 years of ownership6. The dierence arises because
CAPEX for building improvements and expansions (i.e. increases in leaseable square feet)
is signicantly higher for pension fund owned properties, but there is no dierence in leasing
CAPEX between pension fund and REPE fund own properties. This nding is consistent
with a supply-side expansion in space available to rms that allows them to hire and grow.
My nal analysis examines whether there is evidence for a trade-o between nancial
returns and social impact. Put another way, if socially positive economic gains from invest-
ments factor into the utility function of public pension funds, then the economic impact on
employment from the investment osets the disutility from earning lower nancial returns.
6The regression controls for property characteristics, such as age, size in square feet, and sale price; year
xed-eects; and property type xed-eects.
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I nd suggestive evidence consistent with the hypothesis that there is a trade-o between
return and social impact. Considering all CRE investments, those that earn bottom quartile
returns are associated with increases in subsequent zip code employment of similar magni-
tude to investments in higher return quartiles. However, when only considering home-state
investments the magnitude of the employment eect is signicantly larger among invest-
ments that earn bottom quartile returns than CRE investments that earn larger returns. To
perform the analysis, I calculate annualized appreciation returns for all round-trip pension
fund CRE investments (i.e. returns from the purchase and sale of a property during the
sample period). Then, I re-estimate my main dierence-in-dierences specication to cal-
culate the employment impact within a given return quartile and compare the coecients
across return quartiles for the entire cross-section of pension fund CRE investments and for
only those investments made in the home-state.
Prior literature documents the impairment of returns from decision-making frictions,
particularly those related to pension fund governance (Hochberg and Rauh (2013), Andonov
et al. (2018)). However, prior papers do not estimate the actual social impact that pension
fund investments may have and thus cannot rule out its existence and to what extent the
social impact may oset the reduced nancial returns. The challenge is data-related. First,
prior studies use data on investments in private equity funds which provide only a rough
proxy for the location of where the capital is deployed. This makes attribution of real eects
to a specic fund investment dicult.7 Second, the analysis of pension fund investment in
funds masks their dual mandate objectives since GPs retain decision-making control. In
other words, capital is no longer invested according to the pension fund's own objective
function. Third, fund level analysis abstracts from the actions that the investors take to
manage their assets and these activities link both the nancial performance of the asset as
7For example, a General Partner (GP) in the same state as the pension fund will not necessarily allocate
capital into that state since their goal is to nd the highest NPV projects regardless of location to maximize
returns for their LPs and their own compensation. Conversely, a non-local fund could also potentially
deploy a large amount of capital in a pension fund's home state, but the capital committed to the fund
would be counted as non-local" based on the denitions used in prior research.
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well as any potential real impact downstream.
Studying private CRE investments using a combination of detailed transaction data sup-
plemented with asset-level accounting data addresses these issues. First, the invested capital
links directly to a physical location by the nature of real estate being a xed asset. Second,
direct real estate investments are common among institutional investors. This means that
observing direct investments, as opposed to fund investments, better captures the unique
objectives of pension funds because they retain control over key decisions (e.g. acquisition
or disposition) and pension funds have experience making these decisions. Third, direct real
estate investment involves active management akin to a majority shareholder of a publicly
traded rm having control over rm decisions. Since investing in commercial real estate is
not just a simple transfer of ownership, studying dierences in asset-level management helps
to shed light on how investors can aect real outcomes, such as employment, in the locations
where they deploy capital.
This paper relates to the literature on the real eects of private capital investments.
Recent research mainly focuses on the downstream impacts of venture capital investments
and private equity buyouts. One strand in this literature analyzes the eects of private equity
investments on real economic activity at aggregate levels such as country, state, or MSA levels
(Samila and Sorenson (2011); Popov and Rosenboom (2013); Popov (2014); Bernstein et al.
(2017)). Another strand of literature studies how rm-level productivity changes after an
infusion of private capital (Davis et al. (2014); Kerr et al. (2014); Brav et al. (2015); Agrawal
and Tambe (2016); Bernstein and Sheen (2016); Faccio and Hsu (2017); Eaton et al. (2019)).
I add to this literature by studying the eects of private real estate transactions on real
economic activity by using granular zip code level data to isolate local eects. In addition, I
provide direct empirical evidence of social impact stemming from pension fund investments
whereas prior literature has focused on delegated fund investments. The ndings also imply
that the retention of decision-making control is key to generating the employment eect.
My analysis also links to the literature on politics and pension fund investment (Hochberg
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and Rauh (2013); Brown et al. (2015); Bradley et al. (2016); Andonov et al. (2017, 2018)).
Previous ndings show that pension fund boards with more seats allocated to politicians
earn lower returns in their private equity investments. Thise paper shows that pension funds
with more politicized boards make investments that generate larger employment impacts.
In addition, investments made in a pension fund's home state also have signicantly larger
impacts. These results combined indicate that public pension funds place weight on gener-
ating ancillary economic benets to balance the objectives of their dual mandate. Moreover,
these ndings are not only consistent with politically motivated investing, but also with
contemporaneous work that highlights that pension funds and their constituents are willing
to accept investments that have potential to generate socially positive externalities (Barber
et al. (2019); Bauer et al. (2019)). My paper highlights that employment near the invest-
ment site is a measurable impact that is strongly associated with real estate investment.
This growth may act as a potential stand-in" for nancial returns in the utility function of
public pension funds.
More broadly the paper adds to the literature studying the investment patterns of large
institutional investors such as pension funds (Rauh (2006); Bergstresser et al. (2006); Rauh
(2009); Novy-Marx and Rauh (2012); Andonov et al. (2013), sovereign wealth funds (Lerner
et al. (2007); Bernstein et al. (2013)), and endowments (Lerner et al. (2008)). It also ties
to the literature on how institutional investors behave with respect to governance and their
investments (McCahery et al. (2016)).
1.2 Background and Hypothesis Development
Public pension funds are substantial investors in commercial real estate (CRE) with over
$680Bn in assets as of 2016 which represents nearly 28% of all capital allocated to the real
estate asset class (Preqin (2016)).8 Moreover, real estate is a common component of public
8Preqin estimates that, globally, public pension funds account for 15%, by number, of all institutional
investment in the asset class, second only to private pension funds at 19%. However, in dollar terms, public
pension funds allocate over 2 times more capital to real estate than private pension funds  roughly $681Bn
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pension fund portfolios with 84% of public pension funds investing in the asset class and a
typical allocation of about 10%.
Private real estate investment typically takes one of two forms: delegated investment
via real estate private equity (REPE) funds or direct investment where the investor takes
an ownership stake in the property. Theory predicts that the main benet of delegation
for the principal (i.e. the limited partner; LP) is that the agent (i.e. the fund managers,
or general partner; GP) will exert eort to maximize returns, subject to proper incentives
(e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1997)). However, by delegating the LP, such as a public pension
fund, gives up signicant decision making control and adds a layer of nancial intermediation
that increases costs (Andonov et al. (2015); Begenau and Siriwardane (2020)). Thus, direct
investment provides a way to maintain control over key decisions, invest according to their
own preferences, and reduce costs.9
Hypothesis 1: Direct CRE investments, where pension funds can invest solely on their
own accord, will be more likely to aect employment than delegate investments. I use
REPE fund CRE investments as a benchmark for comparison for two main reasons. First,
contracting between LPs and GPs ensures that the primary focus of REPE fund investing is
to maximize nancial returns, which limits the scope for them to invest for other non-nancial
considerations. Second, since public pension funds are major capital contributors to REPE
globally compared to $340Bn  and their capital allocation accounts for nearly one third (28%) of all capital
allocated to the real estate asset class.
9Direct investments can be structured as a separate account, a joint venture, or simply independently
investing in the asset directly. There is ample evidence that investors value this additional control. Data
from Preqin on the real estate investment preferences of public pension funds in my sample shows that 87%
have a stated preference for separate accounts, joint ventures, or directly investing in property. Further
evidence, sampled directly from pension fund annual reports and investment policies, indicates the primary
value is control related to key decisions relating to acquisition, liquidation, or operations as well as fee
reductions. For example, the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB) states in its investment policies
that, for real estate, it prefers to invest in partnerships without co-investment from other nancial entities. In
particular, to provide the WSIB with control related to liquidation, acquisition, and operational decisions,
such as capital expenditures. The investment policies are summarized in the WSIB's CAFR for 2019
located here. Additional evidence comes from Preqin Investor Proles specically for public pension fund
real estate portfolios. For instance, the Arizona State Retirement System views separate accounts as a
highly attractive investment opportunity, due to the low fees and increased investor discretion associated
with the vehicle."
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funds, the setup implicitly contrasts investments made directly by public pension funds with
their own indirect investments. Thus, comparing the incremental eects on employment
between the two simulates an ideal experiment, as closely as possible, where the pension
fund invests with and without considering its dual mandate objectives.
Prior studies show that public pension funds operate in a political sphere. Public
pension fund governance consists of a board of trustees that oversees investment decisions.
The boards are populated with ex-ocio politicians, trustees appointed by politicians or
local governments, and elected pension participants leading to political inuences on the
board (DiSalvo (2018); Anzia and Moe (2019)). The literature shows that this leads to poor
nancial performance of their private equity fund investments and can be attributed to:
private benet extraction, local tilts, or local growth incentives (Hochberg and Rauh (2013);
Andonov et al. (2018)); increased risk taking (Andonov et al. (2017)); or poor manager
selection (Dyck et al. (2020)). Most prior studies focus on the returns earned by public
pension funds on their capital deployed in private investment funds for private equity, venture
capital, and real estate.10
Few papers study the actual impacts generated by the private investments of public
pension funds. A handful of studies have begun to develop our understanding of the eects
of private equity and venture capital fund investments on real economic variables such as
employment and rm-level operations. However, direct evidence of the real impact of private
real estate investment is scarce. This paper develops our understanding by analyzing how
CRE investment by public pension funds aects employment near the investment site (i.e.
zip code) employment.
Hypothesis 2: The size of the estimated employment eect will depend on the strength
of the incentives to invest for impact. Investments located in the same state as the pension
fund (i.e. home state investments) are particularly targeted by pension funds' dual mandates
10Papers by Brown et al. (2015) and Bradley et al. (2016) study the public equity investments of public
pension funds and nd contrasting evidence for whether or not political inuences lead to higher returns
for stock investments.
9
(See Appendix A for a sampling of direct quotes). I test whether these investments deliver
larger impact than investments located outside the home state. Based on the existing liter-
ature, political representation on the board alters the investment decision-making process. I
also test whether the employment impact varies with the degree of political representation
on the board of trustees.
Why does employment change after public pension fund CRE investment? Firm em-
ployment plausibly links to CRE investment because commercial real estate provides the
location where productive inputs, labor and capital, combine to produce output. Most rms
lease their space from property owners instead of owning property outright. Prior studies
show that real estate ownership by rms can negatively aect their ability to grow and high-
growth rms suer the most (Bergeaud and Ray (2017)). Moreover, rms, especially small
ones, face binding nancial constraints since they cannot easily access nancial capital to
expand. Thus, investments in real estate are critical in providing the local space market
with sucient capacity for rms to grow.11
Hypothesis 3: Pension funds aect employment in the zip codes where they invest
because their investments attract follow-on capital and they manage their own investments
dierently than REPE funds. Investments by public pension funds may not fully release
the local space constraints on their own, but their investment acts as a signal about the
potential of the zip code for other investors. This information attracts capital from other
investors that further improves the eciency and productive capacity of local real estate
allowing rms to grow and increase employment. I test whether additional, non-public
pension fund CRE capital ows to the treated zip codes after a pension fund invests.12 In
addition, the properties pension funds buy could undergo signicant capital improvement
11The small business sector in America occupies 30% to 50% of all commercial space  an estimated 20
billion to 34 billion square feet (Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, Small Business Trends:
Small Business, Big Impact).
12Moreover, the impact of this signal should be local and only aect the treated zip code and not the overall
county in which the building is located. I test this corollary by re-estimating the same specication at this
higher level of aggregation to determine whether the county-level investment by other investors changes
as well.
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or aggressive leasing programs to increase the productivity of the building and decrease
vacancy, respectfully.13 I test whether, on average, pension funds spend more on capital
expenditures on their properties relative to REPE funds and whether that CAPEX is in
the form of building CAPEX or leasing CAPEX to uncover dierences in asset-management
associated with public pension fund and REPE fund ownership.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Pension Fund CRE Transactions
My analysis relies on a unique dataset of US commercial real estate (CRE) investments
from Real Capital Analytics (RCA) that covers all US CRE investments greater than $2.5M
between 2001 and 2018. The data includes information about the transaction (e.g. price,
transaction date, property type, capitalization rate, and property location information) and
the assets (e.g. square footage, year built, and estimated occupancy). RCA compiles the
data using a proprietary research process. RCA uses at least two independent data sources
to verify each investment and augments the verication with additional research by RCA
analysts as well as feedback from active CRE brokers and investors. The investments of
interest are direct CRE investments by US public pension funds. Direct CRE investments list
a pension fund, by name, as one of the buyers of record. In contrast, deployment of pension
fund capital via real estate private equity (REPE) funds, where the pension fund is a passive
investor, will list only the REPE fund(s) involved as the buyer(s). Each investment has
information on up to four buyers and sellers. RCA invests substantial resources to identify
the ultimate owner(s) involved in each transaction and uses standardized names across their
database that helps simplify the search for public pension fund buyers.
To help identify public pensions by name, I use data from the Public Plans Database
13This investment to increase and improve the productive capacity of the buildings has a direct impact on
employment because it relaxes the local, zip code level space constraints on rms and spurs hiring by
either: (a) improving the productivity of existing assets that are not optimized for their tenants or (b)
decreasing the vacancy at underutilized properties.
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(PPD) housed at Center for Retirement Research (CRR) at Boston College. The CRR
collects information from the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) published
by public pensions and makes them into a usable dataset for researchers. The PPD data
covers the period from 2001 to 2017 for virtually all public state and local pension plans in
the US.
Matching plan names from the PPD data to the RCA data identies 39 state and local
pension funds from 26 states that invest in CRE with a direct ownership claim. The geo-
graphic distribution of pension plans shown in Figure 1.1 indicates roughly even geographic
coverage of public pension plans.14 The baseline sample consists of 1,703 direct CRE invest-
ments by public pension funds. The aggregate investment value is roughly $93 billion, or
$5.5 billion per year. Pension funds are the sole buyer in 20% of the transactions; 59% of the
transactions are a joint-venture (JV) with a single partner; 18% are JVs with two partners,
and only 2% of the transactions involve 3 partners along with the pension fund.
The property location data helps to generate additional indicators that equal one if the
investments occur in the pension fund's home state, an adjacent state, or a distant state.15
Home state investments account for 19% of the transactions (by number) while adjacent
state and distant state transactions represent 5% and 76% of the transactions, respectively.
I also construct a set of exhaustive indicators for each property type represented in the data:
apartment, oce, industrial, retail, development site, and hotel.
14I match the names of state pension funds from the PPD to the buyer names found in the transaction data
by searching for the pension fund's name across all four listed buyer elds in the RCA data. The name
search yields 1,715 observations. Filtering for investments with non-missing zip code information results
in 1,703 remaining observations.
15The home state indicator equals one if the investment occurs in the same state as the pension fund's
headquarters and equals zero otherwise. The adjacent state indicator equals one for any investments made
in any state that shares a physical border with the pension fund's home state and equals zero otherwise.
Any investment in a state that does not match the above conditions is a distant state and the distant state
indicator equals one and is zero otherwise.
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1.3.2 Zip Code Outcomes
The focus of this paper is to understand the real economic impact of CRE investment on
employment. To do this, requires geographically granular data. I collect zip code employment
and business data from the US Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP) data
series. The CBP contains annual zip code data on employment, business establishments,
and aggregate income from 1994 to 2017.16 The main dependent variable studied is the
natural logarithm of employment in a zip code each year, ln(Emp). A portion of the CBP
data focuses on business establishments and contains NAICS industry classication codes,
up to 6-digits, for all rms in each zip code. The NAICS codes help to disaggregate total
employment into jobs associated with either service-providing or goods-producing industry
supersectors.17 Furthermore, the data enables calculation of a proxy for employment among
rms of varying labor force size.18
In addition to employment, I study the natural logarithm of business establishments and
disaggregate businesses into those with fewer than 50 employees, denoted as small businesses,
and rms with at least 50 employees, denoted as large businesses. An additional dependent
variable, the average wage per worker in a given zip code, comes from the division of the
total annual payroll by total employment.19 Also, the annual growth rates of employment
16The CBP is reported with roughly a two-year lag, so even though the CRE transactions dataset goes to
the end of 2018, the timeframe for my analysis is limited by the end-date of the CBP. Moreover, changes
on how the data is reported by the US Census resulted in the 2018 release being severely redacted with
many observations being set to missing, resulting in a nearly useless zip code level dataset.
17Supersectors are dened using the classication provided on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) website.
The NAICS classications for service-providing and goods-producing industry supersectors can be found
here and here, respectively. Similarly, I use BLS industry classications to isolate high-skill industries,
which they dene as those industries with 2.5x the national average of STEM (Science, Technology, Engi-
neering, and Mathematics) occupations.
18The establishment data classies establishments in each zip code by number of employees using several
bins ranging from 1-4 employees to greater than 1000 employees. I code the midpoints of each bin as the
number of employees per establishment within the bin and then multiply that value by the number of
establishments in that bin to obtain a proxy for the zip code's employment level by rm size. A similar
procedure proxies for employment within each NAICS supersector.
19The natural logarithm of this value is used in the regression analysis.
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and businesses provide time-varying zip code controls for the regression analyses.
1.3.3 Additional Data Sources
Asset-level Information: I also use data from the National Council of Real Estate Invest-
ment Fiduciaries (NCREIF), which contains asset-level accounting data on CRE properties.
The database contains self-reported data from NCREIF members (e.g. investment managers
or corporations) that own real estate with a total market value of at least $50M held in a
duciary, tax-exempt setting. As a condition of membership, each member must contribute
data on their entire portfolio of publicly and privately held institutional CRE investments for
inclusion in the NCREIF property database. The data is reported on a quarterly basis and
the NCREIF sample contains data on 36,236 properties from 1978Q1 to 2017Q2 (roughly
686,000 property-quarter observations).
I combine fuzzy-matching followed by a hand-verication procedure to link the RCA
and NCREIF datasets to enable comparison of asset management strategies between public
pension funds and REPE funds.20 The resulting crosswalk contains 504 matched properties.
This corresponds to a roughly 31% match rate (504 out of 1640 total properties over the
1703 investments by pension funds).
The match rate is relatively low for two reasons. First, only 27 of the 39 pension funds
with investments in the RCA data have corresponding asset-level information in the NCREIF
20While this procedure may seem ad-hoc and tedious, no universal property identier exists to link across
CRE databases. Careful manual matching is essentially the only way to proceed when trying to combine
CRE data sources. To create a crosswalk dataset, I simplify the RCA investments data to only key pieces
of information: the RCA property ID, the property type, address, zip code, state, latitude, longitude,
and the status date (i.e. date of the transaction). A year-quarter variable generated from the status
date represents when the transaction took place and matches the format of the acquisition quarter eld in
the NCREIF data. Next, the 1703 RCA transactions are fuzzy-matched to the NCREIF dataset using a
simplied version of the NCREIF database that contains the same elds as the simplied RCA database.
This simplies the comparison between property and location information by using relying on the zip code
of the property and the transaction quarter (RCA) / acquisition quarter (NCREIF) as a rst-pass. This
generates a dataset with 1977 observations. Third, by hand, I create a unique mapping between the RCA
transactions and the NCREIF properties. Address or lat/long coordinate searches on Google and Bing
Maps locate each of the buildings determine whether the matches correspond to the same property. Some
properties have multiple entrances and RCA or NCREIF may use dierent addresses that correspond to
the same building.
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data. It is likely that the missing pension funds are not NCREIF members. Second, the
match rate suers because there are no matches between the two databases for the initial
fuzzy-match procedure or because the self-reported NCREIF address data is prone to data-
entry errors. For example, 123 15th Street may be input as 1231 5th Street. RCA processes
their address data to verify its accuracy and to report it with a uniform structure, so I take
the RCA addresses as correct. If the data entry errors cannot be easily reverse-engineered or
there is a clear mismatch, then the hand-verication step removes these potential candidate
matches from the sample.
Pension Fund Governance: Data on pension fund board governance comes from the
website of the National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA). For each
state in the United States, the NASRA website provides information on board composition of
the state, county, and city pension funds headquartered in the state. The board composition
information includes the board size, the number of members that are appointed, the number
of board members that are elected, and the number of board members that are ex-ocio.
For each pension fund, I calculate the percent of each board that is appointed, elected, and
ex-ocio, respectively, and indicator variables equal to one for whether the fund's percentage
in each group is above the cross-sectional median.
1.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 describes the real estate investments and the pension funds data. Panel A summa-
rizes the direct CRE investments by pension funds using the RCA data. On average, a public
pension fund in my sample invests $55M dollars though there is substantial heterogeneity
(Std Dev = $140M) and the distribution is skewed right due to some large transactions of
over $1Bn. On average, 15% of direct investments take place in the central business districts
of cities, 19% are in the pension fund's home state, 5% are in immediately adjacent states,
and 76% take place in distant states. The investments are concentrated among the four main
types of CRE: apartment (17%), oce (21%), retail (20%), and industrial (36%). Hotels
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and development sites are 2% and 3% of the transactions, respectively.
Panels B, C, and D describe the characteristics, asset allocations, and reported returns of
the pension funds in the sample using the PPD data. There are 39 pension funds reporting for
17 years resulting in up to 663 pension-year observations. The annual reports that underlie
the PPD data lack standardization and this creates some missing information because of
inconsistent reporting either across or even within pension funds. On average, the 39 plans
have $40Bn in assets and $49Bn in liabilities. They comprise 56% of all pension fund assets,
54% of all pension fund liabilities, and 68% of all real estate assets over the sample period.21
Public pension funds invest the bulk of their assets in pubic equities and xed income
securities, however real estate, private equity, and hedge fund investments combined represent
roughly one quarter of invested assets. The sample pension funds have broadly similar asset
allocations compared to pension funds that are not in my sample, but have slightly lower
allocations to xed income (-1.4%, p < 0.01) and hedge funds (-3.1%, p < 0.01) and a
slightly larger tilt towards real estate (+1.5%, p < 0.01).22 Even with slight dierences in
their portfolio allocations, the portfolio-level returns for the pension funds in my sample do
not dier by a large margin. Real estate and private equity earn the largest annual returns
over the sample period. Overall, the plan-level returns by asset class are similar for pension
funds in my sample compared to those that are not, except that sample pension funds earn
slightly better returns in private equity (+1.6%, p < 0.01).23
1.4 Empirical Methodology
I use a dierence-in-dierences approach to compare the change in employment experienced
in zip codes that receive pension fund CRE investment (treated zip codes) relative to the
change in employment experienced by zip codes that receive investment from real estate
21The gures result from taking the cross-sectional average in each year from 2001 to 2017 and then taking
the time-series average across years and are shown in Appendix Table B.1.
22Appendix Table B.2 shows the details of the asset allocation comparisons.
23Appendix Table B.3 shows the details of the portfolio returns comparisons.
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private equity funds (control zip codes). The main regression specication used in my analysis
is:
yz,c,v,t = αz + γv,t + β1(Treated× Post)z,c,v,t + θXz,c,t−1 + εz,c,t (1)
Where the index z represents zip codes, c represents counties, v represents vintage, and t
represents years. The main dependent variable, yz,c,v,t, is the natural logarithm of employ-
ment, ln(Emp). Treated is an indicator for a treated zip code that is equal to one if the
zip code is one that receives investment from a public pension fund and is equal to zero if
it receives investment from a REPE fund. Post is an indicator equal to zero for all years
before investment, in event-time, and equals one for all subsequent years. The coecient of
interest is β1 that estimates the eect of the interaction (Treated× Post)z,c,v,t. The control
group of zip codes are zip codes invested in by real estate private equity (REPE) funds that
are in the same state as a given treated zip code. Thus, β1 measures the change in ln(Emp)
in zip codes that received pension fund CRE investment relative to the change in ln(Emp)
of zip codes, in the same state, that received investment from a REPE fund.
To help identify the parameter estimates, I include 1-year lagged zip code and county
controls Xz,c,t−1. The controls include 1-year lagged zip code employment growth, business
establishment growth, county GDP growth, county population growth, county employment
growth, and county income growth. These controls account for time-varying factors that
could aect employment outcomes. The main specication also includes zip code xed
eects, αz, to control for time-invariant, omitted variables that dier between zip codes and
vintage-by-year xed eects, γv,t, to control for unobserved common factors that aect all
zip codes invested in the same year over time. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level (Bertrand et al. (2004); Petersen (2009); Cameron and Miller (2015)). This clustering
assumes correlation in the errors across zip codes in the same county, but independence in
the errors for zip codes in dierent counties.
17
1.4.1 Matched Sample Construction
To construct the matched sample, I rst lter the baseline sample of 1,703 direct pension
fund CRE investments to include only those from 2017 or earlier since the Census CBP
data are only available through 2017 while he RCA data covers up to 2018. This results in
a slightly smaller sample of 1,659 investments. The pool of control zip codes contains zip
codes that have investment from REPE funds during the sample period but are not in the
treated group of zip codes. This results in a pool of 4158 candidate control zip codes.
I match each treated zip code one-to-one with a control zip code using propensity score
matching, with replacement, and require common support for both treated and control
observations. The matching procedure uses the following characteristics: ln(Emp)z,t−2 and
ln(Emp)z,t−1 to ensure the zip codes have similar employment levels and employment growth
prior to treatment; the t−1 year to ensure zip codes are invested in during the same year; the
state where the zip code is located; and the county-level capitalization rate.24 The matching
procedure results in 1,323 matches for 2,646 observations that results in a panel of about
45,000 total zip-year observations from 2001 to 2017.
Table 1.2 summarizes the characteristics of the treated and control zip codes.25 The left
panel shows summary statistics for the unmatched sample of zip codes, measured as of one
year before investment. Unconditionally, the control zip codes have fewer business establish-
ments (ln(Est)z, t), more business growth (∆(Emp)z,c,t,t−1), and are located in counties that
receive over $1 billion more CRE investment than treated zip codes. The right panel shows
summary statistics for the matched sample, measured as of one year before any investments
take place in event-time. After matching, there are no signicant dierences between the
24I calculate the county-level capitalization rate  cap rate, for short  using the entire sample of CRE
transactions. Cap rates are derived by dividing the 1-year ahead property-level net operating income by
the market price of the property (i.e. an inverse price/earnings ratio). This provides a direct measure of
expected current yield of the property. Thus, cap rates embed investor opportunity cost of capital, growth
expectations, and risk expectations and provide a measure of expected returns.
25Recall, the treated zip codes are those where a pension fund made a direct CRE transaction and the control
zip codes are those in the same state where a REPE fund invested in CRE.
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characteristics of the treated and control zip codes indicating that the matching procedure
achieved good balance across observable dimensions.
1.4.2 Identication
When pension funds invest directly in commercial real estate (CRE), they can invest accord-
ing to their own preferences. Dual mandates and political inuences alter the investment
decision-making process to favor investments that allow them to internalize both the nan-
cial returns earned and the subsequent economic growth generated. In contrast, real estate
private equity (REPE) fund investments deploy capital strictly to maximize nancial re-
turns. Public pension funds also make delegated CRE investments using REPE funds and
contribute roughly one-third of all capital committed to REPE funds. Thus, comparing
pension fund direct CRE investments to REPE fund CRE investments implicitly compares
when a pension fund takes their incentives to invest for economic impact into account and
when they ignore these incentives to maximize solely nancial gains by delegating control to
fund managers. This makes REPE funds an ideal control group to help understand whether
the dierence in objectives ultimately leads to dierent real outcomes.
The main assumption for internal validity of the dierence-in-dierences estimator is
that the change in employment would have been similar for both the treatment and control
zip codes whether a pension fund invested or not (i.e. the parallel trend assumption). I
illustrate parallel trends for the main dependent variable in this study, ln(Emp), in Figure
1.2 which shows the average value of ln(Emp) for the 4 years before and after. Visually,
there is a lack of dierential trends prior to the investment period for the treated and control
group zip codes and this is conrmed by a leads-lags regression whose coecients are shown,
with 95% condence intervals, in the right panel of the gure.26 The average value of
ln(Emp) for treated zip codes increases and remains elevated for the 4 years after pension
26The leads-lags regression has the exact same setup as Equation 1.4, including controls, xed eects,
and standard error clustering structure. I repeat the graphical and leads-lags regression analyses for
all dependent variables used in my study. The graphs are shown in Figures 1.3 to 1.10.
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fund investment while average ln(Emp) in the control zip codes remains at. The leads-
lags model shows there are no signicant dierences before investment occurs, but there are
signicant dierences afterward. Furthermore, the leads-lags regressions indicate the timing
of the change of employment in the treated zip codes is concentrated around the investment
period and then the dierence continues to evolve over time.
1.5 Results
The analysis below contains three sets of results. The rst examines whether direct CRE
investments by public pension funds aect subsequent zip code employment dierently than
CRE investments made by REPE funds. The second set of results provides evidence for
two potential mechanisms that drive the divergence in subsequent employment growth. The
third analysis describes the realized returns public pension funds earn on their direct property
investments and evaluates whether social impact from economic growth comes at a cost of
nancial returns. In other words, is there an observable negative correlation between nancial
return and social impact?
1.5.1 Employment Eects
In this section, I present evidence that direct CRE investments by public pension funds have a
larger causal impact on zip code employment than investments by REPE funds. Both public
pension funds and REPE funds invest to earn nancial returns, however, only public pension
funds should internalize the economic spillovers their investments generate because of their
anity for these kinds of investments. Given this behavior, their investments should have
a measurable impact. However, if investments made according to dual mandate objectives
are inecient at generating economic growth or the objective itself is simply virtue signaling
then there should be no measurable dierence.
To assess the dierence, I estimate the regression model described in Equation 1.4 on my
matched sample of zip codes over the period from 2001 to 2017. Under the identication
20
assumptions, the estimates measure the dierence in how employment in a zip code changes
after a pension fund invests in CRE relative to how employment changes after a REPE
fund invests. Table 1.3 presents the results. Column 1 reports estimates obtained using all
observations, without any controls or xed-eects, and shows a positive and signicant eect
of 9.4%. Columns 2 and 3 add in vintage-by-year xed eects along with zip and county
controls, and then zip code xed eects, respectively. The estimated coecient decreases
to 8.4% and then 5.5% as observed and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. The
estimates in columns 4 to 6 show the dynamics of the eect. In each column, the estimation
window is restricted to only include observations that are within one, two, or four years before
and after treatment, respectively. The positive eect on employment grows over time from
2% to 3.5% and graphical evidence shown in the rightmost graph in Figure 1.2 illustrates
that the timing of the eect is centered around the time of investment. The estimate in
column 6 shows the rst main result, that direct CRE investments by public pension funds
are associated with a 3.5% larger increase in zip code employment than CRE investments
by REPE funds in similar zip codes over the four years after investment. In addition to
changes in average total employment, I study the dierential impact of pension fund CRE
investments on business growth. Untabulated results show that CRE investments by public
pension funds are associated with a 2.0% larger increase in the number of rms in the zip
codes where they invest relative to similar zip codes where REPE funds invest. Half of the
eect occurs in the rst two years, similar to the dynamics for employment growth. The
more muted dierential growth is consistent with labor being a exible input to production
in contrast to rm creation or relocation. Does the increase in employment alter the size
of rms in the zip codes? To test this hypothesis, I estimate the dierential change in the
number of employees per rm in the zip code. While the coecient is positive, it is not
statistically signicant at standard levels.
Next, I investigate what types of employment are most aected by pension fund CRE
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investments.27 The analysis focuses on how CRE investments aect employment in the
service-providing or goods-producing supersector groups since CRE investments can directly
aect employment in both supersectors. For example, investments in retail or oce proper-
ties aect jobs in the service-sector located in and around the building. Similarly, industrial
property investments or developments can aect employment in the construction and man-
ufacturing industries.28 Table 1.4 presents the results in columns 1 and 2. Employment in
service-providing industries increases by 3.5% more in treated zip codes relative to control
zip codes. However, there is no signicant eect for employment in goods-producing indus-
tries. The service-providing industries that drive the dierence are: professional services,
information, retail, and wholesale trade. Some of these industries contain high-skill workers
which command higher wages. Thus, the increase in employment could also aect wages.
Untabulated results indicate that aggregate annual payrolls rise by 3.9% more in the treated
zip codes relative to control zip codes. However, this increase in payrolls does not correspond
to a dierential increase to the average wage per worker.
Lastly, I explore how CRE investments aect employment at small and large rms where
size is measured by the total number of employees.29 Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.4 show
that zip codes with direct CRE investment by pension funds experience more growth of both
small and large business employment than in zip codes where REPE funds invest.
27I break down the employment data based on whether employment takes place in a service-providing or
goods-producing industry based on 2-digit NAICS codes using business establishment data from the US
Census. The data disaggregates the number of business establishments in the zip code categorized by the
number of workers they employ. The categories are 1 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 249,
250 to 499, 500 to 999, and 1000 or more. I calculate the number of employees as the midpoint number
of workers in the category multiplied by the number of establishments in that category. I then sum up
all employment in the service-providing and goods-producing 2-digit NAICS supersectors and take the
natural logarithm of the sum. Classication for the service-providing and goods-producing 2-digit NAICS
supersectors are based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' categorization replicated in Appendix Table
B.4).
28For instance, industrial properties are often purpose-built properties designed to suit specic needs such
as shipping distribution, warehousing for various goods, manufacturing, or data centers.
29Small rms are dened as those with less than 50 employees. Large rms are those with 50 or more
employees. Using the US Census CBP business establishment data, I sum employment for all rms with
fewer than 50 employees and rms with at least 50 employees and then take the natural logarithm to
construct the dependent variables. The aggregation of workers includes all NAICS industries.
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The evidence in this section shows that, on average, zip codes where pension funds
invest do experience larger real economic gains than zip codes where REPE funds invest.
While the employment gains remain within the service sector, growth for both small and
large businesses drives the employment gains. Overall, the results support the hypothesis
that public pension funds consider dierent objectives when making investment choices.
By investing directly, they retain control of their investments and aord themselves the
opportunity to pick investments according to non-nancial criteria. The estimates show
that their choices do result in a greater incremental impact than investors solely focused on
maximizing nancial returns.
1.5.2 Home-state Investments and Political Incentives
In this section, I test whether the strength of the social impact is associated with the motives
for investing for non-pecuniary reasons. Prior literature has shown that pension funds can
have a home bias that tilts their investments to have a disproportionate amount of invest-
ments located in their home state which can aect investment returns (Hochberg and Rauh
(2013); Brown et al. (2015); Bradley et al. (2016)). Yet, it is not well understood whether
home state investments generate additional economic growth. Investment policy documents
of public pension funds hint at a dierent objective function for home state investments and
a desire to drive economic growth via their investments. For example, pension funds from
Alabama, California, Iowa, and New York, among others, state explicitly in their investment
policies that they make investments in their home states to help local economic growth.
Combining previous results and this anecdotal evidence leads to a natural hypothesis that
employment spillovers should be larger if the investment takes place in their home state
because political inuences and/or willingness to invest for impact should be the strongest.
I test for a dierential eect by using the same model on subsamples of CRE investments.
Table 1.5 shows that home state investments exhibit larger employment spillovers than more
distant investments. Column 1 shows the main result for reference. Column 2 estimates
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the model on a subsample of investments that only took place in the home state of the
pension fund.30 Column 2 shows that home state investments by pension funds lead to a
6.5% larger increase in zip code employment within 4 years than REPE fund investments.
Pension fund investments in adjacent states (column 3) have a statistically insignicant
(but directionally positive) eect. Investments in distant states (Column 4) are associated
with a 2.8% larger increase in zip code employment. I compare the home-state employment
eect vs. that of distant state investments using a triple-dierence model estimated using
a four-year window before and after treatment. The estimated triple-interaction tests if the
dierence between the two eects is zero. I reject the null hypothesis: the dierence of
3.5% between the estimated impact of home and distant state investments is statistically
signicant (p < 0.10). In short, the results show that the average eect of CRE investments
on employment is larger where dual mandate incentives are the strongest.
In addition to home bias, public pension funds operate within a politicized governance
environment (DiSalvo (2018); Anzia and Moe (2019)). Earlier research indicates that this
aects the investment decision making process of the board of trustees (Lerner et al. (2007);
Hochberg and Rauh (2013); Andonov et al. (2018); Dyck et al. (2020)) and can lead to earning
lower returns on their investments. I hypothesize that these same political incentives are also
correlated with the size of the real impact on zip code level employment. If the downstream
impacts of a pension fund's investments are particularly relevant for politically aliated
members of the board (e.g. political appointees and ex-ocio members), then investments
made by boards with more political representation on the board should result in a larger
impact than those made by boards with less political representation. Conversely, if political
considerations are nothing more than posturing that does not alter investment objectives
to additionally consider social impact then there should be no eect. I test whether the
the proportion of each of these groups on the board is related to the size of subsequent
employment gains by comparing the eect for investments made by boards with above or
30Recall that the treated zip codes and the control zip codes are required to be in the same state and only
dier in the type of investor who is the buyer, either a US public pension fund or a REPE fund.
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below median representation of each group.31
Table 1.6 shows the results. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for investments made by
boards with below and above median representation of political appointees on the board.
Boards with a lower percentage of politically appointed members make investments asso-
ciated with a 2.1% increase in employment while investments made by boards with above
median representation result in a subsequent 5% increase in zip code employment. The dif-
ference is statistically signicant. Columns 4 to 6 study variation in the zip code employment
eect for boards with above and below median representation of ex-ocio members. The
eects are essentially the same for both groups (3.5%, p < 0.05). Columns 7 to 9 repeat
the analysis for boards with above and below median representation of elected pension plan
members. The estimates mirror the results for in columns 1 to 3.32 This is expected since the
percentages need to add up to 1 and boards with a large proportion of appointed members
will have a relatively small proportion of elected members.
In summary, incentives to invest for impact will be strongest when the investments are
located in the pension fund's home state or if the pension fund's board has signicant
representation of political appointees. Some new subtleties of the political channel arise
from the results. While both appointed members and ex-ocio members are politically
linked, the primary decision-making pivot that drives investment decisions towards those
with higher subsequent growth eects is the percentage of appointed members on the board.
The impact results here ll in a gap in the literature by providing an assessment of the
opposite side of the coin". While home bias or more political boards have been shown to
invest in ways that lower returns, this paper shows evidence that the investments they choose
can also generate socially positive benets.
31I calculate the percent of the board that is appointed and ex-ocio, calculate the sample median percent-
ages and then run cross-sectional tests of the eect of political representation on the board on employment.
32There is less variation in the percentage of board seats occupied by ex-ocio members than there is to
the number of board seats occupied by appointed or elected members, by roughly a factor of two.
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1.6 Underlying Channels
In this section, I study the potential mechanisms that drive the increased zip code employ-
ment eect observed for CRE investments by public pension funds relative to REPE funds.
The empirical evidence so far indicates that the investments are associated with a 3.5%
larger increase in zip code employment after 4 years, relative to REPE fund investments.
How does this growth get generated?
The analysis explores two potential mechanisms to understand this phenomenon. First, I
study the impact of pension fund capital on subsequent capital ows into the zip code from
other investors. There is substantial heterogeneity across commercial real estate markets.
As a result, investors are not all equally informed about individual markets. One way to
gather information about the market is to observe the investments by large, institutional
investors such as public pension funds. I test whether pension fund investments act as a
signal for other investors to invest. Second, I study whether pension fund-owned properties
are managed dierently than REPE fund owned properties. Successful real estate investment
requires hands-on asset management. Using property cash ow data, I test whether pension
funds spend more on cumulative capital expenditures over the rst 4 years of ownership
relative to REPE funds. Additional tests assess which types of CAPEX dier between the
two investors: capital investments in the building or capital investments to decrease vacancy
by paying lease commissions.
1.6.1 Signaling and Capital Flows of Other Investors
Pension funds are large investors that often invest with sophisticated strategies and they
deploy signicant amounts of capital to real estate each year. Accordingly, other investors
will observe their actions in the market. On one hand, pension fund investment may be a
signal that there are institutional quality assets in the zip code because they are condent to
invest and so other investors follow their lead. This predicts positive subsequent capital ow
from other investors. Conversely, it may also be that pension funds may be late to the game
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and their investment signals a crowded CRE trade. This would negatively predict future
ows from other investors. This is similar to Bikhchandani et al. (1992) where investors
infer private information  in this case, the quality of CRE in the zip code  from the prior
trades of better-informed managers and trade in the same direction. This type of behavior
is also referred to as cascading" in the mutual fund literature (Wermers (1999)). Moreover,
this economic mechanism is agnostic of where the capital is deployed relative to the pension
fund's home state since the revealed information - whether there is institutional quality
commercial real estate - is relevant irrespective of geography. Thus, this eect speaks more
broadly to how (very) local capital ows in commercial real estate are inuenced by trade
activity of large investors.
Subsequent capital ows from other investors can help to increase employment in two
ways: additional investment raises the productivity of existing real estate assets in the zip
code by re-optimizing them and construction of new buildings increases the supply of space.
Both activities shift the supply curve to the right. Two major types of investors that can have
this kind of impact are REPE funds and Developers. REPE funds can pursue value-added
and opportunistic CRE investment strategies.33 Value-added investments target properties
that are not being used to their full potential and typically need mild renovation or re-leasing
to attract better or larger tenants. Opportunistic investments acquire distressed properties,
usually at a discount, and then reposition them which requires signicant investment to
accomplish. Both strategies positively impact the supply of space by making existing CRE
assets more productive inputs for rms, indirectly increasing the supply of space.34 Devel-
opment of new properties directly adds to the supply of space in the zip code. Increased
supply of space puts downward pressure on rental rates. As rental rates fall, existing rms
33REPE funds can also invest in Core strategies. This is the least risky strategy since it involves investing
in properties that are already performing optimally (e.g. fully leased and no major renovation needed).
These types of properties are mainly cash ow investments.
34The indirect increase in supply comes from taking a building that is making suboptimal use of its space
because of poor management or because of a bad tenant mix and making the necessary changes to maximize
the property's use.
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in the zip code are more willing to use real estate as an input to production and expand
while lower rents and (re-)leasing activity attracts new rms to the zip code.
I test the above hypotheses using a dierence-in-dierences regression using the dollar
volume invested in the zip code by other investors as the dependent variable.35 An additional
test examines whether pension fund CRE investment aects capital ows more broadly for
the county where the property is located to understand the geographical extent of the signal
(i.e does it aggregate to the county-level?). For instance, if the information is location
specic, then one would expect there to be statistically signicant eects at the zip code
level and not at the county level.
Table 1.7 shows the estimates. I nd signicant evidence of other investors following
pension funds at the zip code level, but there is no signicant eect at the county level.
In column 1, investment by other investors increases by roughly $40M more in zip codes
where pension funds invest in CRE relative to zip codes where REPE funds invest in CRE.
Columns 2 and 3 show that real estate private equity funds and real estate developers make
up two-thirds of this additional capital ow. In contrast, the county-level analysis shows
positive, but insignicant eects which is consistent with the notion that the information
conveyed is highly local to the CRE investment itself (i.e. the same zip code).
1.6.2 Property-level Management
In contrast to ownership of nancial assets, ownership of commercial real estate requires
management. As a result, both the nancial performance of the property and the economic
growth of the area immediately surrounding link to how eectively a property is managed.
Management includes tasks such as managing tenants and investing in the property via cap-
ital expenditures to improve the productivity of the building via improvements or expansion
35The setup is the similar to the main regressions, but with a dollar volume of investments by other investors
as the dependent variable. Other investors are dened as all investors, excluding US public pension funds.
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of leaseable space.36
Capital expenditures on leasing and tenant improvements occur as leases turn-over. Prop-
erty owners hire lease brokers to search for and secure tenants and brokers are paid com-
missions for this service. Tenant improvements are cash allowances that property owners
allocate to the cost of (re)constructing space for tenant occupancy. Building improvements
and expansions are more capital intense. Building improvements are investments to improve
the common areas of the property (e.g. lobby) or critical systems (e.g. elevators, HVAC).
Building expansion investments result directly in the expansion of a property's leasable
square footage.
I leverage quarterly asset-level accounting data to understand whether management in-
tensity diers between properties owned by pension funds and properties owned by REPE
funds. The rst analysis estimates the dierence in cumulative CAPEX and the second
analysis studies dierences in the two main components of cumulative CAPEX: building
CAPEX and leasing CAPEX.37 I estimate OLS regressions using the specication below:
ln(Cumul.CAPEX)i,p,t = β0 + β11(PFProp)i,p + β2Xi,t + λt + θp + εi,t (2)
where the index i represents a property, p represents property type (e.g. oce), and t
represents a year-quarter (YYYYQ). The indicator 1(PFProp)i equals 1 if the property is
owned by a public pension fund and is 0 otherwise. The coecient of interest, β1, measures
the dierence in cumulative CAPEX between pension fund and REPE fund owned properties.
The controls, Xi,t, contain property characteristics: the size of the property, ln(SqFt); the
purchase price of the property, ln(Purch.Price); and the age of the property at acquisition,
AgeatPurch. The regression includes year xed-eects, λt, and property type xed-eects,
36These costs are not operating expenses (e.g. real estate taxes, insurance, administrative expenses) and
instead are cash outlays that occur outside of the regular operating cycle of a property.
37All regression analyses use the the natural logarithm of the CAPEX measure on the property as the
dependent variable where cumulative CAPEX is the sum of CAPEX spent on the property each quarter
since the property was purchased.
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θp, and standard errors are clustered by county. I estimate the regression for all properties
that are held up to 4 years to match with the estimation window of my main analysis. The
regression sample includes only stabilized properties which, based on the NCREIF denition,
means the property's construction is complete and it is at least 60% occupied.
Table 1.8 shows the results. Columns 1 to 5 in the table use ln(Cumul.CAPEX)i,p,t as
a dependent variable and sequentially add in controls and xed eects. Columns 4 shows
the rst key result: on average, pension funds invest about 28% cumulative CAPEX into
the buildings they purchase. In column 5, the regression sample is restricted to include
only properties from the four major property types: apartment, oce, industrial, and retail.
This ensures that the nding is not driven by investments in (re)development projects which
would require signicantly more CAPEX. The estimated dierence in cumulative CAPEX
remains nearly unchanged.
Columns 6 and 7 test where the dierence in CAPEX intensity comes from: building or
leasing CAPEX.38 The results show that properties owned by public pension funds invest
more into the building, but do not undertake more aggressive leasing and tenant improvement
programs, than REPE funds. These results combined indicate that more property level
investment by pension funds to increase the size and productivity of the property is what
makes it more attractive to new rms or allows existing rms to expand which links the
CAPEX activity to employment.39
1.7 CRE Investment Returns
This section begins with a description of the returns earned by pension funds and how
they fare relative to other CRE investors. After the initial descriptive exercise, the analysis
38Building CAPEX is spent to improve the property or to expand the leasable area. More leasable area
allows for expansion of existing rms within the property or the relocation of new rms to the building.
Both activities increase employment. Lease CAPEX is spent on paying lease brokers to nd tenants and
on tenant improvements (TI) to customize space within the building for new tenants or existing tenants
that renew their lease.
39Unfortunately, the NCREIF data do not have any information on the tenants in the building over the
property's holding period to link the CAPEX directly to changes in employment at the tenant-level.
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examines the correlation between the nancial returns earned and the impact on employment
generated to assess whether social returns (i.e. employment growth) come at a cost of
nancial returns. It is important to understand the trade-o to determine whether targeting
social objective is a logical policy for pension fund investments. If downstream economic
benets oset some of the costs of lower nancial returns then the policies can be viewed as
a net-positive. However, if the economic benets are meager and/or large nancial losses,
then pension funds should reconsider their desire to pursue a dual mandate.
1.7.1 Realized Returns
Commercial real estate assets are infrequently traded assets relative to many other nancial
assets such as public equities. However, the RCA data allow for creation of a property-level
panel to track commercial properties as they transact over time. The sample contains 23,500
properties with at least two transactions in the data (i.e. are bought and sold at least once)
and this generates 54,150 transactions that can be utilized to assess returns.




1. The results are shown in Table 1.9. The rst two rows of the table consider all holding
periods. The average net return is 63% (σ = 254%), the median return is 24%, and the
average holding period is 4.83 years or 58 months, using all observations (N = 30, 602).
If we consider only those properties held for at least 12 months, the average net return is
56% (σ = 238%), the median return is 24%, and the average holding period is 5.18 years,
or 61 months (N = 28, 323). The 7 percentage point decrease in the average net return
due to excluding short-term holds indicates that property ips can earn substantial returns
for investors. However, ipping of commercial properties is uncommon with only about 8%
of transactions being held for less than 1 year and even with the short-hold transactions
removed return variability does not decrease substantially. The return distribution is highly
skewed with some properties earning triple-digit or higher returns. Figure 1.11 illustrates
the return distribution. The plot shows a histogram of returns after removing the 1% tails
31
of the return distribution and considering round-trip transactions where the property is held
for at least 1 year (N = 27, 756).40
To facilitate comparison of returns over dierent holding periods, investors, and property
types, I calculate the annualized rate of return earned on properties that are held for at least
1 year using observed transaction prices. The equation below illustrates the calculation,
where PSale is the sale price of the property, PPurchase is the original purchase price of the
property, and N is the number of years the property is held by the investor, and NOI is the
net operating income of the property at purchase. The holding period, in years, is calculated











Where possible, I incorporate the property's income inferred by using data on the prop-
erty's capitalization rate at purchase.41 Roughly 25-30% of transactions have a cap rate and
thus an implied net operating income (NOI). In calculating the return, I make the simpli-
fying assumption that NOI remains constant over the holding period and is paid out at the
end of each year.42 The average annualized return over the entire sample is 13% (σ = 45%)
and the median annualized return is 6.5% (Table 1.9).
I summarize and compare the CRE returns for investments made by public pension funds
and three additional groups of investors. The rst group contains all CRE investments by
40The skew in the histogram increases substantially if the observations in the 1% tails are included and the
graph becomes uninformative.
41The capitalization rate, or cap rate for short, represents the value of net income earned per dollar paid for
the property. This ratio is an identity that is commonly used in real estate to compare properties with
varying characteristics using a single metric. Intuitively, it is similar to a current yield, the amount of
current income received per current dollar value of the investment, and thus extracting the NOI from the
capitalization rate by dividing the observed market price by the cap rates in the data provides a measure
of current income at the purchase date of the CRE asset.
42The dierence between the ex-NOI and NOI-included returns, averaged across all transactions and in-
vestors, is approximately 1.5%.
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Equity Funds43, Investment Managers44, Open-ended Funds, and Listed Funds. This group
is designated as real estate private equity (REPE). The second group aggregates investments
made by Banks, Corporations, Financial Firms, and Insurance as Finance/Insurance. The
third group consists of transactions by publicly traded REITs, non-traded REITs, and RE-
OCs denoted as REIT/REOC. The last group contains investments by Sovereign Wealth
Funds, Endowments, and non-US pension funds together as Institutions.45
Table 1.10 shows the returns earned by dierent investors. US public pension funds in my
sample earn an annualized return of 7.4% per year (σ = 22.6%), on average, and a median
return of 4.6% per year. Public pensions earn lower returns than the REPE funds, Finance
and Insurance, and Institutional Investor groups but earn higher returns than REITs and
REOCs. However, pension fund investments exhibit the best risk-return measured by the
coecient of variation (CV). Returns for all investor groups have an enormous range from
near total losses (e.g. -92.3% annualized) to multiple fold gains (e.g. 1907% annualized).
The average holding period is roughly 5 to 6 years for all investor groups and the cap rates
implied by their investments are quite similar. REPE funds earn the highest annualized
returns (13.0%, σ = 43.0%) and REITs and REOCs earn the lowest annualized returns
(6.0%, σ = 28.6%).
Next, I look at how returns vary for public pension funds across space. I hypothesize
that public pension funds' incentives to invest for growth are strongest when they invest
locally. If they do trade-o returns for economic growth, then one would expect home
state investments to earn lower nancial returns than investments elsewhere. On the other
hand, these investments may outperform if the public pension fund benets from a local
43These are real estate private equity funds that includes major players such as Bain Capital, Blackstone,
or Starwood Capital as well as many other medium and small rms that take LP capital to invest in real
estate.
44For example, Berkshire Realty Holdings, CBRE Global Investors, or USAA Real Estate.
45Many transactions are carried out by Developer/Owner/Operator investors. These are more speculative
and are usually outside the realm of typical investments made by public pension funds so I exclude these
from the analysis.
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information advantage. Table 1.11 shows that investments in the pension fund's home state
outperform investments elsewhere by a factor of 2 earning a 12% average annualized return
versus a 6% average annualized return for investments in adjacent or more distant states.
A two-sided t-test for the dierence in means for average annualized returns between home
state investments and all other investments is statistically signicant at the 1% level.46
Holding periods are not signicantly dierent across geographies (p < 0.13). The average
capitalization rates and prices for home state investments are larger (p < 0.10) than in other
geographies as well which indicates that the home state investments are not simply a matter
of buy low, sell high. The average price for distant investments is $35M while the average
home state investment is $55M.
1.7.2 Return-Impact Trade-o
While there is some evidence that investors accept lower returns for potential impact by
investing in impact/ESG related funds (Barber et al. (2019)), the existence of actual impact
that may oset the lower nancial returns is not well documented. The main results in this
paper show that public pension funds can generate more zip code employment with their
CRE investments relative to REPE funds. In this section, I assess whether public pension
funds make investment decisions that are consistent with a trade-o between nancial returns
and the employment benet (i.e. impact) that their investments generate.
The returns-impact trade-o assumed in previous literature stipulates that investors de-
rive utility from the social impacts of their investments. This non-pecuniary utility acts
as a replacement for utility gained from nancial returns and, as a result, investors with
a stronger taste for impact will accept lower nancial returns for their investments. The
lower returns may arise for two reasons. First, investments that are associated with positive
economic impacts may be lower NPV projects that earn lower net cash ows over the holding
period. Second, investors are willing to pay more to buy the investment and this lowers the
46The dierence is even larger when looking at average annualized excess returns (9% vs. 3%) and the
dierence remains signicant at the 1%-level.
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realized returns upon exit.
To test for the relationship between returns and the estimated employment impact, I
conduct two cross-sectional tests using my main dierence-in-dierences specication. All
pension fund CRE investments are grouped by return quartile and the regression is run within
each return quartile to compare coecients across each group of investments to determine
the relationship between returns and impact, measured by employment growth. Table 1.12
shows the results for all investments and 1.13 shows the results for home state investments
only. For both tables, each column shows the dierence-in-dierences estimate within a
return quartile subsample. Each panel in the table show the estimates for several estimation
windows (e.g. one year, two years, three years, and four years).
Panel A of Table 1.12 shows that pension fund investments across the distribution of
returns result in larger subsequent increases in employment than investments by REPE funds
using a 1-year estimation window. For example, in Column 1, pension fund investments that
earn bottom quartile returns result in a 3.8% larger increase in zip code employment than
investments by REPE funds. Investments in the top half of the returns distribution (Columns
3 and 4) are associated with 2-2.5% larger increases in zip code employment. In Panel B,
estimated using a 2-year window shows similar results with CRE investments in the bottom
quartile resulting in a 4.6% larger increase in zip code employment. In Panels C and D,
measured using 3- and 4-year estimation windows, the pattern remains qualitatively the
same however only investments in the top quartile of returns exhibit statistically signicant
dierences in subsequent employment growth. Overall, the results provide evidence that the
cross-section of pension fund CRE investments generates socially positive benets of similar
size across the returns distribution.
Results shown in Table 1.13 are estimated in the exact same fashion as those above,
except that they are run on a further reduced subsample of home state investments only. This
additional lter reduces the sample47, but still provides some useful insights into the return-
47Roughly 20% of all transactions occur in the home state and approximately 30% of all investments have
observed capital appreciation returns.
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impact trade-o. Investments in a pension fund's home state are under the most scrutiny
to generate additional jobs because of dual mandate and political pressures. Even with the
small sample, the results show suggestive evidence that the bottom quartile investments are
associated with the largest magnitude impacts on employment. For instance, pension fund
CRE investments in the home state that earn bottom quartile returns are associated with
about 16% to 18% larger increases in subsequent zip code employment relative to REPE
funds using 3- and 4-year estimation windows, respectively.
In conclusion, the results provide suggestive evidence for a return-impact trade-o. CRE
investments with returns in the top half of the distribution are positively associated with
increased zip code employment. In general, investments that earn poor returns (i.e. the
bottom quartile) do not exhibit outsized impact on subsequent employment relative to better
performing CRE investments. However, the return-impact trade-o seems most prevalent for
home state investments. Within this subsample, investments in the bottom return quartile,
which have an average annualized return of -7% per year, are associated with incremental
increases in employment that are substantially larger in magnitude relative to baseline and
to home state investments earning higher returns.
1.8 Robustness
To validate the robustness of my main ndings, I re-estimate the model using several dif-
ferent sample restrictions to ensure that the eects are not being driven by small or very
large transactions, whether the eect is strictly a California eect", and if the results are
inuenced by other omitted time-varying zip code variables. All the additional tests use a
four-year window before and after treatment to be comparable with the main result shown
in column 4 of Table 1.3.
Table 1.14 displays the results of the robustness checks. Column 1 simply shows the main
results for comparison. Columns 2 and 3 test for robustness to the exclusion of transactions
with prices in the left or right tails of the price distribution. The cutos of $5M and $500M
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roughly represent the 5%-tails. The estimated eect in columns 2 and 3 is essentially the
same as the full sample indicating that the results are not sensitive to transaction size.
Columns 4 and 5 test if the estimated association with employment growth is driven primarily
by transactions by the California public pensions, CalPERS and CalSTRS. The California
pensions are pioneers in running their own internally managed real estate portfolios and
thus may have more expertise than other pensions in identifying investments with both a
nancial and real economic gain. However, the data show that both the sample that excludes
all of the California pensions (column 4) and one that included only the California pensions
(column 5) exhibit positive employment growth post-treatment.
Even though I include lagged zip code employment growth and business establishment
growth to control for time-varying zip code characteristics, there could be an omitted vari-
able that aects employment growth. Using data from 2011 to 2017 from the American
Community Survey, I include annual controls for average household size, percent with a col-
lege education, median household income, percent below poverty level, rental vacancy rate,
and the total population of the zip code. Since these controls are only available for a short
period, the sample size drops signicantly and the eect is estimated on the full sample.
Again, the eect is similar to the main result. In untabulated results, even if the model is
re-estimated using a shorter window, such as 1-year or 2-years before and after, the eects
are similar to those in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.3.
I perform additional robustness tests for the main results using an alternative empirical
specication (untabulated). Using deal-level data, I estimate a pooled OLS regressions of
either zip code ln(Emp)t+2 or ∆ln(Emp)t−2,t+2 on an indicator for whether the investment is
a direct pension fund investment or a REPE fund investment. I also include controls for the
property type (indicators; hotel is excluded category); the investment amount, in millions of
dollars; and lags of zip code employment (or employment growth). I also include year and
zip code xed eects and cluster standard errors at the county level. Overall, the results
using this alternative method are similar to the main ndings: after 2 years, employment
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in the treated zip codes is higher by about 2%. This eect is consistent with the results
obtained using the dierence-in-dierences empirical strategy on the matched sample.
1.9 Conclusion
Investments in commercial real estate assets can reect local economic activity. However,
some CRE projects may anchor economic growth, whereas others simply ride the existing
wave. In this paper, I show that direct CRE investments made public pension funds have
a subsequent positive impact on employment that is 3.5% larger than CRE investments
by REPE funds, on average. The location of the investment relative to the pension fund
is also correlated with the size of subsequent employment growth. Home state investments
generate a 6% increase in zip code employment in the 4 years that follow. Moreover, political
inuences on the board of trustees aect the types of investments chosen. Boards with more
political appointees make investments that result in roughly 2% larger employment benets
than boards with fewer politically appointed members. The investments spur job growth in
the service-sector and the eects are felt at both small rms and large employers.
I examine two potential explanations for why pension fund investments result in subse-
quent employment growth. First, their investment acts as a signal to other investors that
the zip code contains high quality properties which attracts subsequent investments. The
analyses show that treated zip codes receive an additional $38M in investment after treat-
ment and the eect does not aggregate up to the county, so the information from pension
fund investment is very localized. In addition, the majority of follow-on capital comes from
REPE funds and developers. These investments help to improve the property stock and
decrease constraints on the supply of space. Second, since CRE ownership requires diligent
management of the property, I compare capital expenditures on building improvements and
leasing between pension fund owned properties and REPE fund owned properties. I nd
that pension funds invest more into the buildings measured by cumulative CAPEX. Their
cumulative CAPEX spending on building improvements is the key driver. This investment
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improves building productivity and capacity (i.e. leasable square footage) enabling rms to
grow.
Pension funds earn respectable returns on their direct investments. On average, they
earn 7% annualized returns and these investments also appear to outperform the roughly
4% return (measured as IRR) earned from their delegated investments (untablulated).48
Moreover, when considering the location of their investments, home-state investments earn
signicantly higher returns (12%) compared to distant-state investments (6%).
Do pension funds face a returns-impact trade-o when choosing their CRE investments?
Many public pension funds state in their investment policies that they will consider invest-
ments that drive additional economic benets, in particular job growth. My nal analysis
looks at how the size of the employment eect correlates with realized returns on direct in-
vestments. I nd that investments in the bottom quartile of returns, which have an average
annualized return of -7%, are associated with positive impacts on subsequent employment of
roughly 4% when considering a 2-year horizon post-investment. Moreover, bottom quartile
return investments in the home state investments are associated with an 18% increase in zip
code employment in subsequent 4 years and the eect is qualitatively the same when con-
sidering shorter horizons. Even though the estimates are noisy, this result shows suggestive
evidence in favor of the return-impact trade-o. The results also imply that the objectives
of dual mandates may come a high cost to public pension funds and that committing a large
portion of the portfolio for these goals would potentially be unwise.
Are the spillovers able to compensate the pension funds for the nancial returns they
forgo? Of the pension funds that invest over$1Bn directly in CRE, the average share of
direct investments in their total real estate portfolios as of 2016 is 35%. The California state
pensions, CALPERS and CALSTRS, are outliers that invest on average 85% of their real
estate portfolio directly. Excluding them reduces the average share of direct investments to
25% of the real estate portfolios of the pension funds. Either way, direct CRE investments
48The average annual IRR earned on commitments in their portfolio is about 4% (commitment-weighted)
or 5% (equal-weighted).
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represent a large share of their allocation and of their real estate portfolio returns. A back
of the envelope calculation indicates that the eects of the spillovers likely do not oset the
lower returns. The average home state CRE investment is about $55M. The average treated
zip code has 19,500 jobs and the average increase in employment is 3.5% in the 4 years
after investment. This translates into roughly 700 additional jobs in the average zip code.
Average wages in treated zip codes in the home-state investment sample are about $54,000
which translates into about $37.6M in additional payrolls of local benet over 4 years. There
are 270 home state investments in the sample which translates into an aggregate eect of
$10.1Bn. Only a fraction of this additional income will be collected as tax revenue. It seems
that while the spillovers provide local benets, they probably do not improve the nancial
position of the pension funds.
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Figure 1.1: This map highlights the states where the public pension funds in the analysis sample
are located. The states lled in green are those in which a pension fund that has direct CRE
transactions is headquartered. The public pension funds in the sample are either state or local (e.g.
county or city) pension funds. In total, there are 39 pension plans from 26 states.
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Figure 1.2: Plots of pretrends for the main dependent variable, ln(Emp). The line graph on the
left shows the average level of ln(Emp) in the treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes. Treated zip
codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes received CRE investment
from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state and received investment from
equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the right plots the regression coecients
from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 1 of Table B.5 that illustrates the dynamics of the
eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no statistical dierence between the two
series.
Figure 1.3: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(ServiceEmp). The line graph on
the left shows the average level of ln(ServiceEmp) in the treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes.
Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes received
CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state and received
investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the right plots the
regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 2 of Table B.5 that illustrates
the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no statistical dierence
between the two series.
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Figure 1.4: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(GoodsEmp). The line graph on
the left shows the average level of ln(GoodsEmp) in the treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes.
Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes received
CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state and received
investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the right plots the
regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 3 of Table B.5 that illustrates
the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no statistical dierence
between the two series.
Figure 1.5: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(SmallBizEmp). The line graph
on the left shows the average level of ln(SmallBizEmp) in the treated (red) and control (blue)
zip codes. Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes
received CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state
and received investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the
right plots the regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 4 of Table B.5
that illustrates the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no
statistical dierence between the two series.
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Figure 1.6: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(BigBizEmp). The line graph on
the left shows the average level of ln(BigBizEmp) in the treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes.
Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes received
CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state and received
investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the right plots the
regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 5 of Table B.5 that illustrates
the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no statistical dierence
between the two series.
Figure 1.7: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(Est). The line graph on the left
shows the average level of ln(Est) in the treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes. Treated zip
codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes received CRE investment
from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state and received investment from
equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the right plots the regression coecients
from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 6 of Table B.5 that illustrates the dynamics of the
eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no statistical dierence between the two
series.
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Figure 1.8: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, Zip $ Volume of Other Investors. The
line graph on the left shows the average level of Zip $ Volume of Other Investors in the treated (red)
and control (blue) zip codes. Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while
control zip codes received CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located
in the same state and received investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line
graph on the right plots the regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 7
of Table B.5 that illustrates the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0,
there is no statistical dierence between the two series.
Figure 1.9: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, County $ Volume of Other Investors.
The line graph on the left shows the average level of County $ Volume of Other Investors in the
treated (red) and control (blue) zip codes. Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension
funds while control zip codes received CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are
located in the same state and received investment from equity funds in the same treatment year.
The line graph on the right plots the regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in
column 8 of Table B.5 that illustrates the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests
at time 0, there is no statistical dierence between the two series.
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Figure 1.10: Plots of pretrends for the dependent variable, ln(WageperWorker). The line graph
on the left shows the average level of ln(WageperWorker) in the treated (red) and control (blue)
zip codes. Treated zip codes received CRE investments from pension funds while control zip codes
received CRE investment from equity funds. The control zip codes are located in the same state
and received investment from equity funds in the same treatment year. The line graph on the
right plots the regression coecients from a leads-lags model, estimated in column 9 of Table B.5
that illustrates the dynamics of the eect. Before the pension fund invests at time 0, there is no
statistical dierence between the two series.
Figure 1.11: Histogram of the net returns for property level transactions. The plot shows a
histogram of returns after removing the 1% tails of the return distribution and considering only the
round-trip transactions where the property is held for at least 1 year (N = 27, 756).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for the pension funds. Panel A summarizes the characteristics
of commmercial real estate investments by public pension funds in the sample. Panel B shows
summary statistics of the characteristics of the public pension funds. Panel C summarizes their
asset allocations. Panel D summarizes their portfolio level returns by asset class. The data for
Panel A come from the main sample of CRE transactions while panels B, C, and D use the Public
Plans Database.
Panel A: Pension Fund CRE Transactions N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Sq ft. 1586 427,702 178,777 2,165,536 1,728 58,806,000
Year Built 1560 1985 1987 22 1722 2020
Price ($M) 1703 54.51 21.43 140.19 0.24 2829.04
CBD 1703 0.15 0 1
Apartment 1703 0.17 0 1
Oce 1703 0.21 0 1
Retail 1703 0.20 0 1
Industrial 1703 0.36 0 1
Hotel 1703 0.02 0 1
Dev. Site 1703 0.03 0 1
Home State 1703 0.19 0 1
Adjacent State 1703 0.05 0 1
Distant State 1703 0.76 0 1
Observations 1703
Panel B: Pension Fund Characteristics
Assets ($Bn) 655 40.13 17.19 49.21 1.32 302.42
Liabilites ($Bn) 655 48.68 23.80 59.88 1.44 436.70
Funded Ratio 655 0.82 0.83 0.18 0.34 1.79
Required Contribution ($Bn) 643 1.08 0.58 1.50 - 10.89
% Req Cont Paid 650 0.91 1.00 0.28 0.00 5.28
Total Contributions ($Bn) 659 1.48 0.79 2.03 0.01 16.54
Total Benets Paid ($Bn) 459 2.09 1.14 2.36 0.06 15.57
Total Membership 644 320,509 169,819 362,481 6,710 1,925,459
Panel C: Pension Fund Asset Allocation
Equity 661 53.9% 54.5% 9.3% 22.3% 76.2%
Fixed Income 661 26.2% 25.3% 7.6% 7.2% 53.5%
Real Estate 553 8.5% 8.5% 3.3% 0.1% 18.7%
Private Equity 523 7.8% 7.4% 5.2% 0.0% 26.0%
Hedge Funds 281 6.0% 4.3% 5.1% 0.0% 24.0%
Commodities 178 4.7% 3.5% 4.0% 0.1% 18.2%
Cash 492 2.7% 2.0% 2.4% -9.0% 17.2%
Panel D: Pension Fund Returns
Assumed Invt. Return 652 7.8% 7.8% 0.3% 6.8% 8.5%
Equity 582 6.6% 10.5% 16.9% -42.0% 53.5%
Fixed Income 601 5.8% 6.1% 4.5% -15.9% 21.5%
Real Estate 521 9.7% 11.6% 12.7% -47.9% 40.4%
Private Equity 477 10.8% 13.2% 14.7% -53.7% 45.3%
Hedge Funds 236 4.9% 6.0% 9.6% -34.6% 39.0%
Commodities 154 3.7% 5.0% 13.2% -55.3% 42.9%
Cash 269 2.1% 1.1% 3.2% -25.2% 19.0%
Observations 663
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for the treated and control zip codes. The panel on the left com-
pares the treated zip codes (i.e those that receive public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE)
investments) to control zip codes (i.e. real estate private equity (REPE) fund CRE investments).
The comparison is made using data as of 1-year prior to the investment year. REPE funds tend
to invest in zip codes with higher business growth and in zip codes located in counties that receive
more investment on average. The right panel compares the matched sample of zip codes at period
t − 1 in event time (i.e. the year before CRE investment). The table shows that after matching,
characteristics of the treated and control zip codes not dier signicantly on observable characteris-
tics. In addition, those variables that were not statistically dierent in the unmatched sample, but
were economically distant  such as county business growth, ∆(Est)z,t,t−1, which diered by nearly
5%  are all similar.
Unmatched Comparison Matched Comparison
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Control Treated Di. t Control Treated Di. t
ln(Emp)z,t 9.769 9.765 0.004 0.157 9.782 9.815 -0.032 -0.922
ln(Est)z,t 6.890 6.838 0.052
∗∗ 2.505∗∗ 6.875 6.890 -0.014 -0.490
∆(Emp)z,t,t−1 0.022 0.033 -0.010 -1.332 0.032 0.030 0.003 0.595
∆(Est)z,t,t−1 0.030 0.076 -0.045 -0.862 0.019 0.020 -0.001 -0.282
∆(RealGDP )z,c,t,t−1 0.026 0.025 0.001 0.850 0.025 0.024 0.001 0.843
∆(Pop)z,c,t,t−1 0.011 0.011 -0.000 -0.206 0.010 0.010 -0.000 -0.799
∆(Emp)z,c,t,t−1 0.019 0.015 0.004
∗∗∗ 6.880∗∗∗ 0.011 0.010 0.001 1.453
∆(PerCapInc)z,c,t,t−1 0.050 0.050 -0.000 -0.256 0.042 0.042 0.001 0.345
(CRE$V ol)z,c,t,t−1 3573.486 2690.064 883.422
∗∗∗ 6.685∗∗∗ 2266.474 2442.698 -176.224 -1.136
Observations 23086 2646
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Table 1.3: Public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE) investments have a dierential eect
on zip code employment. The dependent variable is ln(Emp). The variable Treated is an indicator
equal to 1 for any zip code that received CRE investment from a public pension fund. Otherwise,
the indicator is equal to 0 for all zip codes that received CRE investment from a REPE fund.
The variable Post is an indicator equal to 1 for all years after treatment, inclusive. The variable
Treated × Post is the product. Each specication from column 1 to 3 is estimated using the full
sample and adds, in sequence, vintage x year FEs to control for secular trends; controls for time-
varying zip and county growth measures; and zip code FEs to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Note the addition of xed eects into the regression subsume the Treated and Post indicators.
Column 3 estimates the main specication using all data. Columns 4 and 5 estimate the eect on
subsequent employment using 1-year and 2-year windows to understand the dynamics of the eect
and they show the eect is relatively rapid. Column 6 shows the main result: public pension fund
CRE investments result in a 3.5% increase in employment in the 4 years following investments. For
all estimations, standard errors are clustered by county.





Treated × Post 0.094∗ 0.083 0.054∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(1.87) (1.46) (3.67) (2.98) (3.15) (2.98) (3.17)
Adj. R2 Within 0.004 0.052 0.023 0.047 0.051 0.046 0.036
Clusters 237 231 231 215 218 214 204
Observations 44,659 37,286 37,286 6,563 10,376 13,299 14,861
Zip FE N N Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Window All All All +-1Yr +-2Yr +-3Yr +-4Yr
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE) investments aect employment in
the service sector and have positive impact on businesses with fewer than 50 employees (small) and
those with more than 50 employees (large). Using the main regression specication in Equation 1.4,
I estimate the eect of public pension fund CRE investment on broad sector employment (columns 1
and 2) and the eect on employment at dierent sized rms (columns 3 and 4). I classify employment
into Service sector and Goods Producing sector employment using NAICS codes from the Bureau
of Labor statistics. Small businesses are dened as those with fewer than 50 employees while large
businesses are those with 50 or more employees. All regressions estimate the eects using a 4 year
pre/post investment window, include controls for time-varying zip and county growth measures,
include zip and vintage x year xed eects, and standard errors are clustered by county.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Service Emp) ln(Goods Emp) ln(Small Biz Emp) ln(Big Biz Emp)
Treated × Post 0.035∗∗∗ 0.002 0.020∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(3.56) (0.14) (3.06) (2.66)
Adj. R2 Within 0.988 0.974 0.993 0.984
Clusters 204 204 204 203
Observations 14,568 14,552 14,568 14,544
Zip FE Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Window +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE) investments have a larger impact
on employment if they are located in the home state of the pension fund. The dependent variable
for all regressions shown in the table is ln(Emp). For reference, column 1 displays the main result
from Table 1.3, column 6. Using the main regression specication in Equation 1.4, I re-estimate
the model for subsamples based on where the CRE investment is located relative to the home state
of the public pension fund making the investment. Results in column 2 are for CRE investments
located the home state of the pension fund. Column 3 shows the result for investments in adjacent
states, those that share a physical border with the pension fund's home state. Column 4 estimates
the model on investments taking place in distant states (i.e. those states that are not in the rst
two groups). The magnitude of the eect diminishes with distance. Home state and distant state
investments exhibit positive and signicant spillovers to employment and are statistically dierent
from each other (column 5, triple dierence regression). AAll regressions estimate the eects using
a 4 year pre/post investment window, include controls for time-varying zip and county growth
measures, include zip and vintage x year xed eects, and standard errors are clustered by county.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated × Post 0.035∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.040 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(3.17) (4.32) (1.31) (2.06) (2.04)
Home -0.011
(-0.67)
Treated × Home 0.016
(0.66)
Post × Home -0.023
(-1.22)
Treated × Post × Home 0.035∗
(1.78)
Sample Main Home Adjacent Distant Home v.
Distant
Adj. R2 Within 0.036 0.045 0.035 0.042 0.042
Clusters 204 65 25 189 201
Observations 14,861 3,080 460 11,321 14,401
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Window +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Public pension funds with more political appointees on the board make investments that are associated with larger subsequent
employment gains. The table shows the regression results of cross-sectional tests using the main regression specication in Equation 1.4.
The sample is split based on the board composition for appointed, ex-ocio, and elected members on the board. Columns 1 to 3 compare
the eect on ln(Emp) for boards with below or above median percent of appointed board members. Columns 4 to 6 compare the eect
on ln(Emp) for boards with below or above median percent of ex-ocio board members. Columns 7 to 9 compare the eect on ln(Emp)
for boards with below or above median percent of elected board members. Overall, boards with above median appointed or below median
elected percent of the board invest in CRE properties that are associated with stronger employment eects after treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Appointed Ex-Ocio Elected
Treated X Post 0.021∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(1.89) (3.49) (1.77) (2.77) (2.53) (2.83) (3.10) (2.13) (2.97)
Appointed 0.008
(0.80)
Treated X Appointed -0.016
(-1.17)
Post X Appointed -0.007
(-0.48)




Treated X Ex-Ocio -0.023
(-1.07)
Post X Ex-Ocio 0.006
(0.47)




Treated X Elected 0.028∗
(1.71)
Post X Elected 0.001
(0.05)
Treated X Post X Elected -0.026
(-1.51)
Adj. R2 Within 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
Clusters 147 161 204 111 179 204 149 159 204
Observations 7,239 7,621 14,861 3,468 11,393 14,861 7,579 7,282 14,861
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Window +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr
% of Board LT Median GE Median LT vs GE Median LT Median GE Median LT vs GE Median LT Median GE Median LT vs GE Median
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Informative Signal Channel : public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE) in-
vestments lead to more capital owing to the treated zip code from other investors. The dependent
variables in columns 1 to 3 are the dollar volume of investment at the zip code level, in millions,
from other investors (i.e. investors that are not US public pension funds). The dependent vari-
able in column 1 is the aggregate dollar volume over all non-public pension fund investors while
the dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are the dollar volume invested by real estate private
equity (REPE) funds and developers, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 repeat the analysis but at the
county level. At one geographic level higher than zip code, the county level, investment signals for
a specic zip code will be less important to the capital ows of other investors. Overall, there is a
$40M increase in investment in the treated zip code by other investors in the 4 years after a pension
fund invests (column 1) and roughly half of the eect comes from subsequent REPE fund and De-
veloper investments. There is no statistically signicant eect at the county level. All regressions
estimate the eects using a 4 year pre/post investment window, include controls for time-varying
zip and county growth measures, include zip and vintage x year xed eects, and standard errors
are clustered by county.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zip Invt Zip Invt Zip Invt Cty Invt Cty Invt Cty Invt
by Others ( $ ) by REPE ( $ ) by Dev ( $ ) by Others ( $ ) by REPE ( $ ) by Dev ( $ )
Treated × Post 38.652∗∗∗ 16.100∗∗∗ 8.457∗∗ 27.472 30.316 14.274
(2.82) (2.88) (2.01) (0.41) (0.92) (0.79)
Adj. R2 Within 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.307 0.313 0.183
Clusters 204 204 204 204 204 204
Observations 14,833 14,833 14,833 14,874 14,874 14,874
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Window +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Asset Management Channel : public pension fund commercial real estate (CRE) assets receive more CAPEX. Using asset-
level accounting data, I estimate a panel regression with the dependent variable being the natural logarithm of cumulative CAPEX on
the property. Cumulative CAPEX is the sum of CAPEX spent on the property each quarter since the property was purchased. In
columns 1 to 5, I regress ln(Cumul.CAPEX) on an indicator, 1(PFProp), equal to 1 if the property is owned by a public pension
fund and it is equal to 0 if owned by a real estate private equity (REPE) fund. I control for the size of the property, ln(SqFt); the
purchase price of the property, ln(Purch.Price); and the age of the property at acquisition, AgeatPurch.. The regression is estimated
for all properties owned up to 4 years to match with my main DD analysis window, that are stabilized, and are acquired after 1997. The
regression includes year and property type xed eects and standard errors are clustered conservatively by county. In columns 5 and 6, I
estimate what type of CAPEX investment is being done on the property: building improvements and expansions or leasing commissions
and tenant improvements, respectively. Overall, public pension funds invest more CAPEX and they primarily invest CAPEX to improve
the building's productivity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Cumul. CAPEX) ln(Cumul. CAPEX) ln(Cumul. CAPEX) ln(Cumul. CAPEX) ln(Cumul. CAPEX) ln(Bldg CAPEX) ln(Lease CAPEX)
1(PFProp) 0.688∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.292∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.043
(5.03) (4.49) (2.81) (2.10) (2.14) (2.28) (0.26)
ln(Sq Ft) 0.755∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗
(15.33) (17.80) (17.39) (12.48) (18.87)
ln(Purch. Price) 0.009 -0.008 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.005
(1.21) (-1.39) (-2.76) (-1.94) (-0.94)
Age at Purch. -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-10.69) (-5.12) (-5.49) (-5.67) (-3.34)
Adj. R2 Within 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14
Clusters 420 420 399 399 339 315 277
Observations 57,982 57,982 46,803 46,803 43,313 32,461 27,020
Property Type FE N N N Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Summary statistics for property transaction-level returns. The table shows the mean, standard deviation, and the overall
distribution of simple net returns and holding periods for all observations; and simple returns, holding periods, and annualized returns
for all transactions where the holding period is greater than or equal to 1 year. The returns are calculated using a property-level panel
using actual transaction prices.
N Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 Median P75 P95 P99 Max
Net Returns (%) 30602 0.629 2.545 -1.000 -0.742 -0.519 -0.062 0.239 0.609 2.504 9.286 180.710
Hold Period (Years) 30602 4.834 3.220 0.000 0.083 0.667 2.333 4.083 7.000 10.750 13.333 17.333
Net Returns - >= 1 Year Hold (%) 28323 0.560 2.385 -1.000 -0.744 -0.524 -0.072 0.244 0.601 2.124 8.158 180.710
Hold Period - >= 1 Year Hold (Years) 28323 5.185 3.090 1.000 1.083 1.333 2.667 4.500 7.250 10.917 13.417 17.333
Annualized Returns - >= 1 Year Hold (%) 28323 0.130 0.456 -1.000 -0.299 -0.120 0.002 0.065 0.158 0.493 1.500 27.519
Observations 30602
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Table 1.10: Nominal appreciation returns to CRE investments, by investor. The table shows the annualized returns for all investors
listed as Institutional, Private, or Public that have at least 40 round-trip transactions in the data. The returns are calculated using a
property-level panel for properties that are held at least 1 year. The returns are calculated using actual transaction prices and also include
property NOI, where available. The Sharpe Ratios are calculated taking the average yield on 5-year treasuries over the sample period
from 2001-2018 to match with the average holding period of about 5 years.
Investor N Mean SD Std Err CV Min Median Max Hold (Yr) N Caprate Mean Caprate (%)
PF Sample 814 0.074 0.226 0.008 3.061 -0.784 0.048 3.921 5.801 202 0.068
REPE Funds and Invt Managers 16502 0.130 0.430 0.003 3.308 -0.923 0.070 19.072 5.016 3976 0.068
REITs and REOCs 2178 0.060 0.286 0.006 4.752 -0.866 0.029 6.131 6.302 617 0.072
Finance and Insurance 1770 0.111 0.408 0.010 3.689 -0.746 0.044 7.089 5.116 369 0.070
Institutional Investors 391 0.091 0.552 0.028 6.086 -0.476 0.038 9.991 6.031 95 0.064
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Table 1.11: Returns for pension fund investments based on location of the property. The table
shows summary statistics for the returns earned, holding period, and going-in capitalization rates
for investments made by public pension funds in the analysis sample. The returns are calculated
using a property-level panel for properties that are held at least 1 year using actual transaction
prices and include property NOI, assumed to be at over the holding period, where available.
Location Variable N Mean SD Std Err Min P1 Median P99 Max
Home State Return (%) 129 0.12 0.22 0.02 -0.51 -0.36 0.09 0.86 1.18
Holding Period (Yr) 143 4.90 3.51 0.29 0.00 0.00 3.92 13.75 15.25
Cap Rate (%) 42 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.09
Adjacent State Return (%) 28 0.06 0.14 0.03 -0.23 -0.23 0.04 0.56 0.56
Holding Period (Yr) 31 4.44 3.54 0.64 0.08 0.08 3.33 16.17 16.17
Cap Rate (%) 13 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08
Distant State Return (%) 657 0.06 0.23 0.01 -0.78 -0.56 0.04 0.78 3.92
Holding Period (Yr) 697 5.61 3.45 0.13 0.00 0.25 5.17 12.83 15.75
Cap Rate (%) 197 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.10
Total Return (%) 814 0.07 0.23 0.01 -0.78 -0.43 0.05 0.81 3.92
Holding Period (Yr) 871 5.45 3.47 0.12 0.00 0.17 5.00 13.08 16.17
Cap Rate (%) 252 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.10
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Table 1.12: Return-Impact trade-o estimates for all pension fund CRE investments. This table
shows the results from estimating the main dierence-in-dierence regression specication (Equation
1.4) on subsamples of investments based on their location in the realized capital appreciation return
distribution. For example, column 1 shows estimated treatment eects for all investments in the
bottom quartile while column 4 shows the estimates for all investments in the top quartile of returns.
Each panel of the table shows the results using dierent estimation windows of 1-year (A), 2-years
(B), and 4-years (C) pre- and post-investment. All regressions include zip code xed eects, vintage
x year xed eects, and zip and county economic growth controls. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 1-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.038∗ 0.009 0.027∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(1.82) (0.71) (2.09) (2.43) (2.28)
Adj. R2 Within 0.086 0.010 0.052 0.216 0.049
Clusters 51 46 57 52 201
Observations 366 436 390 398 4,950
Panel B: 2-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.046∗∗ 0.024 0.026∗∗ 0.030 0.019∗∗∗
(2.05) (0.94) (2.22) (1.51) (2.63)
Adj. R2 Within 0.083 0.064 0.026 0.184 0.051
Clusters 54 47 57 50 204
Observations 619 716 618 626 7,790
Panel C: 3-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.051 0.018 0.011 0.047∗ 0.025∗∗
(1.66) (0.61) (0.92) (1.79) (2.57)
Adj. R2 Within 0.058 0.066 0.006 0.148 0.049
Clusters 54 46 56 50 198
Observations 861 930 786 806 9,909
Panel D: 4-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.045 0.014 0.016 0.052 0.035∗∗∗
(1.27) (0.40) (1.08) (1.32) (3.16)
Adj. R2 Within 0.050 0.040 0.004 0.057 0.040
Clusters 54 45 49 41 189
Observations 1,099 1,122 838 774 11,021
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Return Quartile 1 2 3 4 N/A
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Return-Impact trade-o estimates for home state investments. This table shows the
results from estimating the main dierence-in-dierence regression specication (Equation 1.4) on
subsamples of home state investments based on their location in the realized capital appreciation
return distribution. For example, column 1 shows estimated treatment eects for all investments
in the bottom quartile while column4 shows the estimates for all investments in the top quartile
of returns. Each panel of the table shows the results using dierent estimation windows of 1-year
(A), 2-years (B), and 4-years (C) pre- and post-investment. All regressions include zip code xed
eects, vintage x year xed eects, and zip and county economic growth controls. Standard errors
are clustered at the zip code level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 1-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.120 -0.006 0.008 0.016 0.020∗
(1.29) (-0.35) (0.22) (0.50) (1.80)
Adj. R2 Within 0.084 -0.127 -0.094 -0.483 0.038
Clusters 8 7 14 12 64
Observations 76 60 97 68 1,190
Panel B: 2-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.123 -0.025 0.031 0.057 0.033∗∗
(1.78) (-0.73) (1.15) (1.63) (2.27)
Adj. R2 Within 0.081 0.010 -0.001 -0.018 0.027
Clusters 8 7 13 11 65
Observations 125 98 151 99 1,880
Panel C: 3-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.161∗ -0.008 0.011 0.098∗ 0.043∗∗
(2.11) (-0.18) (0.57) (2.08) (2.52)
Adj. R2 Within 0.135 0.079 0.109 0.113 0.040
Clusters 8 7 13 11 65
Observations 174 138 177 118 2,430
Panel D: 4-Year Window
Treated × Post 0.182∗ 0.023 -0.001 0.094 0.055∗∗∗
(2.19) (0.43) (-0.04) (1.53) (2.97)
Adj. R2 Within 0.140 0.075 0.043 0.431 0.042
Clusters 8 7 10 7 63
Observations 219 170 184 90 2,627
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Return Quartile 1 2 3 4 N/A
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Robustness test for the main results measuring employment spillovers from pension
fund CRE investments. All of the below robustness tests are conducted using an estimation window
that include 4 years before and after the investment event. Column 1 shows the main result from
Table 1.3, Column 6 for reference. Column 2 re-estimates the main specication dropping all CRE
transactions less than $5M (roughly the bottom 5% of transactions by size). Column 3 drops
all transactions with transaction price greater than $500M (roughly the top 5% of transactions
by size). Column 4 excludes all investments made by California pension funds (CalPERS and
CalSTRS). Column 5 includes only investments made by California pensions. Column 6 uses a model
estimated with additional time-varying zip code controls extracted from the American Community
Survey. This reduces the sample size signicantly because the ACS data is only available from
2011 - 2017. Overall, the results show the main estimates are stable across a variety of alternative
samples and specications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated × Post 0.035∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(3.17) (2.85) (3.18) (4.02) (2.01) (3.64)
Adj. R2 Within 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.046 0.126
Clusters 204 196 204 136 168 121
Observations 14,861 13,050 14,775 5,794 9,066 3,811
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Window +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr +-4Yr
Sample Main Price gt 5M Price lt 500M No CA Only CA Cty + Zip Ctrls
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX A: INVESTMENT POLICY QUOTES
The following quotes are hand collected from various sources listed next to the names of
the public pension funds. The quotes indicate that public pension funds have additional
investment objectives, that include spillovers on employment, in addition to the traditional
nancial risk-reward criteria. CalPERS CAFR 2017
While we are a global investor, CalPERS is also proud to make investments in
California. The Fiscal Year 2015-16 CalPERS for California report showed $27.3
billion was invested in our home state, representing 9.3 percent of the PERF.
These dollars were invested across multiple asset classes, including public equity,
xed income, private equity, and real assets. These commitments support local
jobs, contribute to major infrastructure projects, and support business expansion
eorts."
CalSTRS California Investment Policy (adopted October 2001)
While the exclusive purpose of any investment is to achieve the desired return, at
a prudent level of risk, and achieving proper diversication, the Committee rec-
ognizes that many investment activities may have the ancillary benet of creating
economic value and activity that benet the state and its citizens. Therefore,
within the investment activity of each asset class, if all things are equal, espe-
cially in regards to risk, return, and diversication, CalSTRS will give preference
to investments focused or based in California."
Alabama ERS Investment Policy (2018)
...ERS recognizes that a stronger Alabama equates to a stronger Employee Re-
tirement System, and as such, investments in Alabama businesses are encouraged
to the extent the investment return meets the criteria delineated by this policy
statement. Any Alabama investment must be forecast to have a return compa-
rable to other investments in the same asset class."
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Iowa PERS (CAFR 2018)
From the section outlining the Investments in Iowa policy. IPERS is authorized
to invest money in accordance with general investment policy rules but can also
invest in a manner that will enhance the economy of the state, and in particular,
will result in increased employment of the residents of the state."
MassPRIM Investment Policy Document
PRIM recognizes its obligations under Massachusetts law to seek investment
opportunities that will benet the economic climate of the Commonwealth as a
whole, provided that such investments are consistent with PRIM's obligations
to the members and beneciaries of its participating retirement systems. (See
M.G.L. ch. 32, sec. 23(2A)(h)) Accordingly, in cases where investment charac-
teristics, including returns, risk, liquidity, compliance with allocation policy, and
others, are equal, PRIM will favor those investments with a substantial, direct
and measurable benet to the economy of the Commonwealth."
New York State Common Retirement Fund (Website)
Whenever possible, the Comptroller guides the Fund to invest in New York-based
business ventures, companies and other programs that spur economic growth and
create and retain jobs. The Fund...invests in commercial real estate properties."
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table B.1: Comparison of the sample pension fund assets, liabilities, and real estate allocation
to those of public pension plans not included in the sample. The public pensions in my sample
represent, on average, 56% of total assets, 54% of total liabilities, and 68% of total real estate
assets.
Year Assets ($Bn) Assets ($Bn) Liabilities ($Bn) Liabilities ($Bn) % Real Estate ($Bn) Real Estate ($Bn)
All PFs Sample PFs % All PFs Sample PFs % All PFs Sample PFs %
2001 2122 1216 57% 2080 1163 56% 87 66 76%
2002 2184 1192 55% 2299 1236 54% 92 66 72%
2003 2185 1190 54% 2449 1315 54% 88 63 71%
2004 2279 1259 55% 2606 1397 54% 88 63 71%
2005 2373 1333 56% 2774 1499 54% 97 66 69%
2006 2523 1426 56% 2957 1594 54% 121 83 69%
2007 2739 1554 57% 3168 1713 54% 147 102 69%
2008 2835 1610 57% 3353 1810 54% 190 130 69%
2009 2764 1560 56% 3527 1909 54% 173 116 67%
2010 2805 1594 57% 3698 2008 54% 166 114 69%
2011 2867 1636 57% 3854 2103 55% 192 130 68%
2012 2894 1658 57% 3996 2179 55% 227 154 68%
2013 2993 1713 57% 4158 2275 55% 235 157 67%
2014 3198 1834 57% 4361 2387 55% 243 159 66%
2015 3353 1918 57% 4574 2507 55% 271 178 66%
2016 3317 1917 58% 4605 2576 56% 299 197 66%
2017 3112 1672 54% 4267 2212 52% 242 147 61%
Column Average 2738 1546 56% 3454 1876 54% 174 117 68%
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Table B.2: Comparison of the sample pension fund asset allocations and those of public pension
plans that are not included in the sample. The portfolio allocation data come from the Public
Plans Database that extracts the information from the annual reports of US public pension plans.
Overall, the sample plans have a 1.4% lower portfolio allocation to xed income (p < 0.01), a 1.5%
larger allocation to real estate (p < 0.01), a 3.1% lower allocation to hedge funds (p < 0.01), and a
0.4% larger cash holdings (p < 0.01).
Non-Sample Pensions Sample Pensions Dierence t-statistic (uneq.)
Equity 53.5% 53.8% -0.3% -0.63
1930 640
Fixed Income 27.8% 26.4% 1.4% 3.62
1937 640
Real Estate 7.0% 8.5% -1.5% -8.31
1438 532
Private Equity 7.6% 8.0% -0.3% -1.14
1279 502
Hedge Funds 9.2% 6.1% 3.1% 7.67
952 189
Cash 2.3% 2.7% -0.4% -2.95
1462 471
64
Table B.3: Comparison of the sample pension fund asset returns and those of public pension
plans that are not included in the sample. While the portfolio allocations may dier for several
asset classes across pensions (shown in the previous table), the returns earned by the sample pension
funds only dier by +1.6% for private equity investments (p < 0.01). Returns for all other asset
classes are not statistically dierent.
Non-Sample Pensions Sample Pensions Dierence t-statistic (uneq.)
Equity 7.3% 6.6% 0.7% 0.91
1611 567
Fixed Income 5.9% 5.8% 0.1% 0.31
1540 580
Real Estate 8.8% 9.7% -0.8% -1.22
1200 500
Private Equity 9.4% 11.0% -1.6% -2.00
991 456
Hedge Funds 4.9% 5.0% -0.1% -0.14
621 230
Cash 1.8% 2.1% -0.3% -1.09
672 269
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Table B.4: 2-digit NAICS codes from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The table shows the
2-digit NAICS code classications used to classify zip code employment into service-providing and
goods-producing supersectors. The dependent variables, ln(ServiceEmp) and ln(GoodsEmp), are
created by taking the natrual logarithm of the sum of employment at rms in the Service-Providing
and Goods-Producing supersectors for each zip code.
Panel A: Service-Providing Industries
Supersector Sector NAICS
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities Wholesale Trade 42
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities Retail Trade 44-45
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities Transportation and Warehousing 48-49
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities Utilities 22
Information Information 51
Financial Activities Finance and Insurance 52
Financial Activities Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 53
Professional and Business Services Professional, Scientic, and Technical Services 54
Professional and Business Services Management of Companies and Enterprises 55
Professional and Business Services Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 56
Education and Health Services Educational Services 61
Education and Health Services Health Care and Social Assistance 62
Leisure and Hospitality Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 71
Leisure and Hospitality Accomodation and Food Services 72
Other Services (except Public Administration) Other Services (except Public Administration) 81
Panel B: Goods-Producing Industries
Supersector Sector NAICS
Natural Resources and Mining Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 11




Table B.5: Estimates for leads-lags models (Falsication Test of DD Framework). Each column
in the table shows the estimated coecients for a leads-lags model with 4 leads and 4 lags for each
of the dependent variables studied in the paper. The baseline is the year before treatment, year
t− 1. Overall, the estimated coecients before treatment do not dier statistically from zero.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(Emp) ln(Service Emp) ln(Goods Emp) ln(Small Biz Emp) ln(Big Biz Emp) ln(Est) Zip Invt by Others ($) Cty Invt by Others ($) ln(Wage per Worker)
Treated × t− 4 0.004 0.001 -0.019 -0.009 0.003 -0.007 -33.920 1.772 0.002
(0.34) (0.14) (-0.95) (-1.27) (0.24) (-1.06) (-1.24) (0.02) (0.21)
Treated × t− 3 0.018∗ 0.008 0.007 -0.000 0.005 0.001 -33.060 -60.848 -0.000
(1.80) (0.89) (0.44) (-0.02) (0.53) (0.12) (-1.65) (-0.72) (-0.03)
Treated × t− 2 0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.006∗ 0.001 -0.006∗ -26.187 42.487 0.002
(0.55) (-0.39) (0.48) (-1.90) (0.10) (-1.95) (-1.65) (0.55) (0.51)
Treated × t 0.017∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.014 0.005∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.005∗ 8.581 74.598 0.005
(2.33) (2.54) (-1.25) (1.75) (2.24) (1.87) (0.86) (1.10) (1.16)
Treated × t+ 1 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.002 0.012∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 21.896∗ 8.885 0.008
(3.71) (5.04) (-0.10) (3.26) (3.19) (3.35) (1.96) (0.10) (1.34)
Treated × t+ 2 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.003 0.020∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 19.053 124.994 0.005
(4.39) (4.78) (0.17) (3.69) (3.28) (3.74) (1.39) (1.14) (0.87)
Treated × t+ 3 0.049∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.007 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 11.699 -93.988 0.004
(3.59) (3.89) (0.29) (3.28) (2.47) (3.36) (0.81) (-1.10) (0.67)
Treated × t+ 4 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.020 0.025∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 28.524∗∗ 19.221 0.002
(3.85) (3.88) (0.92) (2.98) (2.85) (3.23) (2.43) (0.24) (0.31)
Adj. R2 Within 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.01
Clusters 204 204 204 204 203 204 204 204 204
Observations 14,861 14,568 14,552 14,568 14,544 14,874 14,833 14,874 14,861
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Vintage x Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Pension fund transactions make up most of the $ volume in the zip codes in which they
invest. This table shows the investments made by pension funds relative to the investments made
in the same zip codes by other institutional investors. Comparing the numbers in this table versus
the previous table shows that the pension funds are very important players in the local real estate
capital markets. Their investments can be interpreted as a large shock to the zip codes in which
they invest. Of this sample of zip codes, pension fund investments represent the entire investment
in the zip code in 38% of observations and pension fund investments that represent at least 75% of
total investment in 50% of observations.
Year N PF Investments PF Volume ($) Mean PF Investment ($) Total Volume ($) Pct PF Volume
2001 69 3684.59 53.40 7909.05 47%
2002 49 2691.24 54.92 4406.38 61%
2003 39 3168.01 81.23 5946.03 53%
2004 52 2380.21 45.77 5952.89 40%
2005 182 8321.14 45.72 25016.99 33%
2006 124 5819.84 46.93 22131.76 26%
2007 108 7951.94 73.63 29278.41 27%
2008 55 2335.88 42.47 4200.99 56%
2009 97 1966.19 20.27 2962.83 66%
2010 69 3119.78 45.21 5116.12 61%
2011 61 3091.42 50.68 8409.71 37%
2012 50 4495.11 89.90 12380.87 36%
2013 35 4420.99 126.31 9695.92 46%
2014 60 4773.66 79.56 14062.14 34%
2015 33 1879.74 56.96 7735.43 24%
2016 36 5545.67 154.05 22241.88 25%
2017 27 2702.18 100.08 7967.83 34%
2018 32 11544.41 360.76 27992.31 41%
Grand Total 1178 79892 223407.54 36%
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Table B.7: Panel regression to predict the location choice of pension fund investments. The
dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for the year when a pension fund invests in CRE
in a given zip code. Multiple investments in a given zip code are aggregated. The panel starts with
40,854 zip codes per year from 2001 to 2018 resulting in 735,372 observations. The sample size
diminishes signicantly to (183,899 observations or fewer; about 12,000 zip codes per year) because
I only keep zip codes with employment data that is not suppressed for the full sample period, all
controls are trimmed at the 1%-level, and must have non-missing data. Fixed eects for Year,
County, and Zip are included as noted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the county
level.






t−2 + δz + γc + θt + εz,c,t (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(PFInvt) 1(PFInvt) 1(PFInvt) 1(PFInvt)
ln(Emp)z,t−2 0.003
∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(10.05) (10.00) (9.31) (0.50)
∆(Emp)z,t−3,t−2 -0.003
∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(-2.57) (-2.51) (-2.38) (-2.42)
∆(HPI)z,t−3,t−2 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(1.01) (-1.48) (-0.64) (-0.77)
∆(Pop)c,t−3,t−2 0.029 0.019 -0.037 -0.036
(1.27) (0.85) (-1.34) (-1.30)
∆(Wage)c,t−3,t−2 0.017
∗∗ 0.005 0.009 0.009
(2.12) (0.65) (1.02) (1.05)
∆(Emp)c,t−3,t−2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.07) (0.06) (1.00) (1.16)
ln($Invt)t−2 0.001
∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(7.75) (8.27) (0.83) (0.90)
NInvtt−2 0.000 0.000
∗ -0.000 -0.000
(1.30) (1.95) (-1.16) (-1.14)
NCREIFt−3,t−2 -0.006
∗∗ -0.017 -0.005 -0.004
(-2.33) (-1.13) (-0.47) (-0.30)
Adj R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Clusters 1247 1247 1247 1247
Observations 155,769 155,769 155,769 155,769
Year FE Y Y Y
County FE Y Y
Zip FE Y
SE Cluster Cty Y Y Y Y
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.8: Nominal appreciation returns to CRE investments, by investor, excluding NOI. The table shows the annualized returns for
all investors listed as Institutional, Private, or Public that have at least 40 round-trip transactions in the data. The returns are calculated
using a property-level panel for properties that are held at least 1 year. The returns are calculated using actual transaction prices only.
The Sharpe Ratios are calculated taking the average yield on 5-year treasuries over the sample period from 2001-2018 to match with the
average holding period of about 5 years.
Investor N Mean Return StDev Return SE Mean Min Median Max Sharpe Ratio (5Yr Treasury) Mean Hold (Yr) Mean Cap Rate
Developer/Owner/Operator 6473 0.155 0.571 0.007 -1.000 0.061 27.519 0.225 5.1 0.069
Equity Fund 9291 0.138 0.457 0.005 -0.923 0.070 19.072 0.246 4.5 0.068
Finance 279 0.114 0.331 0.020 -0.493 0.055 2.834 0.264 4.3 0.073
Insurance 791 0.096 0.492 0.018 -0.340 0.015 7.089 0.143 5.3 0.070
REOC 163 0.096 0.406 0.032 -0.615 0.049 4.205 0.172 5.1 0.067
Non-US Pension Fund 471 0.093 0.537 0.025 -0.611 0.029 9.991 0.124 6.2 0.066
Investment Manager 596 0.092 0.340 0.014 -0.746 0.034 4.080 0.193 5.3 0.068
Bank 7116 0.088 0.394 0.005 -0.840 0.036 11.000 0.157 5.6 0.069
US Public Pension Fund 814 0.060 0.229 0.008 -0.784 0.032 3.921 0.147 5.8 0.068
Non Traded REIT 374 0.057 0.429 0.022 -0.540 0.011 6.131 0.072 6.6 0.073
Sovereign Wealth Fund 61 0.045 0.269 0.034 -0.476 -0.007 1.217 0.069 3.9 0.051
REIT 1680 0.033 0.228 0.006 -0.866 0.002 2.813 0.031 6.3 0.073
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Table B.9: Geographic distribution of CRE transactions for all investors and for US public
pension funds. The table below shows the number of investments and percent of investments made
in each state (i.e. equally weighted) for all CRE transactions (columns 2 and 3) compared to
the CRE transactions made by US public pension funds (columns 4 and 5). Column 6 calculates
the dierence in the percentage of deals conducted in each state by subtracting the percent of all
transactions (benchmark) from the percent of pension fund transactions. On average, the geographic
allocations are similar for PFs relative to other investors.
State N Percent N N PF Percent N PF Dierence (PF - All)
AL 675 0.7% 4 0.2% -0.5%
AK 23 0.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
AZ 3266 3.4% 34 2.0% -1.4%
AR 208 0.2% 2 0.1% -0.1%
CA 16647 17.5% 364 21.4% 3.9%
CO 2770 2.9% 38 2.2% -0.7%
CT 776 0.8% 9 0.5% -0.3%
DE 157 0.2% 3 0.2% 0.0%
DC 981 1.0% 14 0.8% -0.2%
FL 8303 8.7% 112 6.6% -2.1%
GA 4784 5.0% 68 4.0% -1.0%
HI 379 0.4% 7 0.4% 0.0%
ID 102 0.1% 0 0.0% -0.1%
IL 5104 5.4% 146 8.6% 3.2%
IN 1142 1.2% 20 1.2% 0.0%
IA 171 0.2% 5 0.3% 0.1%
KS 463 0.5% 8 0.5% 0.0%
KY 519 0.5% 4 0.2% -0.3%
LA 354 0.4% 3 0.2% -0.2%
ME 83 0.1% 0 0.0% -0.1%
MD 2174 2.3% 43 2.5% 0.2%
MA 2673 2.8% 22 1.3% -1.5%
MI 1289 1.4% 30 1.8% 0.4%
MN 1379 1.4% 42 2.5% 1.0%
MS 188 0.2% 1 0.1% -0.1%
MO 1159 1.2% 13 0.8% -0.5%
MT 22 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
NE 152 0.2% 1 0.1% -0.1%
NV 1543 1.6% 16 0.9% -0.7%
NH 144 0.2% 2 0.1% 0.0%
NJ 2397 2.5% 79 4.6% 2.1%
NM 279 0.3% 0 0.0% -0.3%
NY 6222 6.5% 105 6.2% -0.4%
NC 3137 3.3% 51 3.0% -0.3%
ND 42 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
OH 2074 2.2% 33 1.9% -0.2%
OK 471 0.5% 3 0.2% -0.3%
OR 967 1.0% 22 1.3% 0.3%
PA 2273 2.4% 33 1.9% -0.4%
RI 120 0.1% 1 0.1% -0.1%
SC 967 1.0% 15 0.9% -0.1%
SD 26 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
TN 1678 1.8% 35 2.1% 0.3%
TX 10346 10.9% 156 9.2% -1.7%
UT 534 0.6% 5 0.3% -0.3%
VT 33 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
VA 2744 2.9% 60 3.5% 0.6%
WA 2556 2.7% 65 3.8% 1.1%
WV 67 0.1% 0 0.0% -0.1%
WI 724 0.8% 28 1.6% 0.9%
WY 20 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 95307 100.0% 1703 100.0% 0.0%
Mean 1869 2.0% 33 2.0% 0.0%
Median 776 0.8% 13 0.8% -0.1%
St Dev. 2998 3.1% 60 3.5% 1.0%
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Table B.10: Geographic distribution of CRE transactions for all investors and for US public
pension funds. The table below shows the dollar value (billions) of investments and percent of
investments made in each state (i.e. value weighted) for all CRE transactions (columns 2 and 3)
compared to the CRE transactions made by US public pension funds (columns 4 and 5). Column
6 calculates the dierence in the percentage of deals conducted in each state by subtracting the
percent of all transactions (benchmark) from the percent of pension fund transactions. On average,
the geographic allocations are similar for PFs relative to other investors.
State $ (Bn) Percent $ $ PF (Bn) Percent $ PF Dierence (PF - All)
AL 12.2 0.4% 0.0 0.0% -0.4%
AK 0.4 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
AZ 75.7 2.4% 1.7 1.8% -0.6%
AR 2.9 0.1% 0.0 0.0% -0.1%
CA 612.4 19.7% 19.0 20.5% 0.8%
CO 82.0 2.6% 2.0 2.2% -0.5%
CT 19.7 0.6% 0.5 0.6% -0.1%
DE 4.4 0.1% 1.1 1.2% 1.0%
DC 84.1 2.7% 1.2 1.3% -1.4%
FL 215.1 6.9% 4.0 4.3% -2.6%
GA 113.0 3.6% 2.5 2.6% -1.0%
HI 41.6 1.3% 5.1 5.5% 4.2%
ID 1.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
IL 158.0 5.1% 6.7 7.2% 2.1%
IN 18.0 0.6% 0.4 0.4% -0.2%
IA 1.4 0.0% 0.1 0.1% 0.0%
KS 7.5 0.2% 0.1 0.2% -0.1%
KY 8.2 0.3% 0.2 0.2% 0.0%
LA 8.3 0.3% 0.1 0.1% -0.2%
ME 1.6 0.1% 0.0 0.0% -0.1%
MD 67.5 2.2% 2.0 2.2% 0.0%
MA 126.9 4.1% 2.0 2.1% -2.0%
MI 17.9 0.6% 0.7 0.8% 0.2%
MN 30.8 1.0% 0.9 1.0% 0.0%
MS 3.7 0.1% 0.0 0.0% -0.1%
MO 18.8 0.6% 0.8 0.9% 0.3%
MT 0.3 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
NE 2.5 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
NV 49.2 1.6% 1.3 1.4% -0.2%
NH 3.1 0.1% 0.1 0.1% 0.0%
NJ 70.2 2.3% 2.3 2.5% 0.2%
NM 3.8 0.1% 0.0 0.0% -0.1%
NY 533.9 17.1% 14.9 16.0% -1.1%
NC 62.8 2.0% 1.3 1.4% -0.6%
ND 0.8 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
OH 29.5 0.9% 0.6 0.6% -0.3%
OK 5.9 0.2% 0.1 0.1% -0.1%
OR 28.8 0.9% 0.7 0.7% -0.2%
PA 55.0 1.8% 1.6 1.7% -0.1%
RI 2.9 0.1% 0.0 0.0% -0.1%
SC 15.0 0.5% 0.4 0.4% 0.0%
SD 0.2 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
TN 30.5 1.0% 0.8 0.8% -0.1%
TX 273.1 8.8% 10.6 11.4% 2.6%
UT 10.3 0.3% 0.2 0.3% -0.1%
VT 0.9 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
VA 99.7 3.2% 2.5 2.7% -0.5%
WA 94.5 3.0% 4.0 4.3% 1.3%
WV 1.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
WI 9.2 0.3% 0.4 0.5% 0.2%
WY 0.2 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 3116.6 100.0% 92.8 100.0% 0.0%
Mean 61.1 2.0% 1.8 2.0% 0.0%
Median 17.9 0.6% 0.5 0.6% -0.1%
St Dev. 119.1 3.8% 3.7 3.9% 1.0%
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